The Regimental System in the United States Army:
Its Evolution and Future.

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Final report. 11 June 1976

92p.

A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented
to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The Regimental System in the United States Army: Its Evolution and Future		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Final Report 11 Jun 76 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Mayew, Walter L., CPT, USA		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS US Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATSW-SE		12. REPORT DATE 11 Jun 76 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 180
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(If different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

~~(Distribution limited to the Department of Defense agencies only...)~~

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Thesis prepared at CGSC in partial fulfillment of the Masters Program requirements, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

See reverse.

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From the American Revolution to the mid-20th century, the regiment, with only a few exceptions, was a primary Army organization. The regiment was also a primary vehicle for the development of American Army histories and traditions. Because of its prominence in history, there are a number of champions for revival of the regiment as an active Army organization.

This study examines the evolution and future of the regiment as an American Army organization. Its purpose is to provide information for a response to the question, "Should the regiment be revived as an active Army organization?" The Army today faces a challenge of providing the best possible organizations with constrained resources. In light of this challenge it is beneficial to consider the historical implications in major reorganization at regiment level.

Regiments are no longer active US Army organizations because reorganizations caused by improving technology and tactics resulted in their elimination from American Army divisions. The inactive regiments are still an influence on Army organization through the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS). CARS provides many advantages of the regiments without the turbulence of frequent inactivations and reorganizations which led to the regiments retirement. The study concentrates on history in order to explain what the regiment was. Problems experienced by the regiments and organizational changes are highlighted throughout the thesis.

The Army's libraries provided the source material through published histories of the Army, periodicals, reports, and printed records. The study concludes that the regiment should remain in retirement providing its treasures of history through the Combat Arms Regimental System. Because of the great dispersion of modern battlefields, conventional or nuclear, the Army must have tactical organizations that are capable of independent operations that are self-sufficient administratively and logistically. Today's battalions now meet those requirements with more flexibility than was possible with the old regiments.

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.B.A., University of Miami, 1972

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AUG 4 1976

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Port Leavenworth, Kansas
1976

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate ___Walter L. Mayew, Cpt., USA___

Title of thesis ___The Regimental System in the United___

___States Army: Its Evolution and Future___

Approved by:

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Accepted this 27ᵗʰ day of April 1976 by _____
Director, Master of Military Art and Science.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those
of the individual student author and do not necessarily
represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College or any other governmental agency.

ABSTRACT

From the American Revolution to the mid-20th century, the regiment, with only a few exceptions, was a primary Army organization. The regiment was also a primary vehicle for the development of American Army histories and traditions. Because of its prominence in history, there are a number of champions for revival of the regiment as an active Army organization.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the
evolution and future of the regiment as an organiza-
tion of the US Army. There is a considerable amount
of support for revival of the regiment as an active
organization because there is a strong belief that
because of the regiments prominence in Army history
it carries with it a capability for a higher level
of esprit de corps and morale than other Army organ-
izations. The regiments were the custodians of Army
history and traditions. Two items which it is be-
lieved can be used to develop esprit de corps and
concurrently increase unit morale by fostering pride
among unit members. This thesis examines the evo-
lution of the regiment from its origins in Europe to
its retirement in the American Army so that readers
will feel confident that they know what the regiment
was, and how it differed from other Army organizations.
The size of the regiments or the exact details of its
organization are not critical to the conclusions.
However, details of organization are frequently re-
viewed to depict the general direction of changes and
the effects of changing technology and tactics. The
primary purpose of the thesis is to seek an answer to

the question, "Should the Army revive the regiment as an active organization?" Only through a review of the regiments history, the comments of its proponents, and pertinent findings of sociologists can the question be answered with any authority.

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CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGIMENT IN EUROPE

The term regiment appears throughout history in almost every army in the world.[1] The regiment is a body of troops, consisting of a variable number of battalions, squadrons, or other units, organized to facilitate administration on a command level below a division and above a battalion.[2] The entire organization of the regiment would be prescribed by a table of organization.

Although there were many times that regiments assumed the roles of tactical units, normally, the regiment was not a tactical organization, nor was it intended to be. The regiment evolved for purposes of administration, discipline, and instruction for a number of subordinate units, and to provide those units with a central supply system and a replacement depot system that would permit subordinate units to maneuver and fight more effectively.[3]

The exact date of the organization of the first regiment is difficult to determine. It could have been as early as 1421, when British historians claim that the Scotsmen-at-arms entered the service of France as

archers or infantry, or as late as 1478, when the
German mercenary bands began to appear.[4] For the
developers of the regiment we can give credit to the
military systems of six different countries, France,
Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and England.

At the beginning of the 14th century the
British raised armies by contract in a modification
of traditional patterns of feudal levies. Each
knight or noble contracted with the English king to
raise a force for foreign operations according to
his means. Foreign operations for British noblemen
were a means of enrichment.[5] This practice led to a
large group of men in England, and Scotland, who not
only desired employment on   European continent,
but had developed the skills with longbow and pike
to be sought after for their abilities. The period
in French history from 1380 to 1422 was a chaotic era
of economic crisis and civil war. The French noble-
men hired many Scotsmen-at-arms and English bowmen.

In the early 15th century the French suffered
a slow and systematic conquest by the English and
their Burgundian allies despite the charismatic leader-
ship of Joan of Arc. From 1421 to 1429 the French Army
was only beginning to use the organized company. The
warfare practiced in most of Europe until 1445 was still
feudalistic, i. a system popularly known in France as

"Livery and Maintenance."[6]   Between 1445 and 1449 from
what they had learned from their own experiences and
drawing upon the experiences of the rest of Europe, the
French formed the western world's first standing army.[7]

From 1421 to 1444 the Swiss found that the
practice of professional warfare could be profitable.
Swiss leaders sought contracts to fight for the
highest bidder. These Swiss leaders commanded bands
known as companies, formed on a commercial basis[8]
under colors of both Swiss and Italian units to take
profits from plunder or ransom. The companies   ried
in strength from tens to thousands, and manpower came
from many countries. The mercenary system developed
best in Italy because intense economic rivalry among
the wealthy Italian states made it necessary for them
to maintain the services of Swiss companies.

By 1478 the German states, inspired by the
growth of the Swiss reputation as professional fighters
and the growth of Swiss gold reserves from this enter-
prise, elected to raise a competing mercenary force.[9]
Some writers credit these bands of Germans as the tac-
tical ancestors of the modern regiment. German states
provided commissions to the Oberats (Colonels) and sup-
ported the efforts of the Obersts to recruit, train and
employ companies of "Landsknechtes" (Infantry).[10]   Each
Oberst recruited several thousand men, divided them

into companies, and provided them with their regimental colors (Fahnlein).

The colors were the symbols of their corporate existence, military spirit, and pride in the regiment. When one of the German Free Companies, or Landsknechte, formed, the commander read the terms of service to the men. Following this, each man raised three fingers and swore allegiance in the name of the Trinity. Then the commander formed a ring with his men, after having placed his ensigns inside the ring, delivered their colors and exhorted each man to defend those colors to the death.[11]

The use of colors was not a new idea. Roman maniples used a handful of straw on the end of a pole as a rallying point in battle. When the Romans re-organized the maniples[12] into cohorts[13] a gilded symbol such as a boar, or a dragon replaced the straw. In later years, each cohort replaced its symbol with a square piece of cloth embroidered with its own distinctive unit markings. Each legion during the same time had as its symbol an eagle, which the Romans considered sacred.[14]

The men of the Landsknechtes learned to master tactics of maneuver and the use of gunpowder rapidly. It was not long before the Landsknechtes developed an admirable reputation and, more importantly, one worthy of emulation. The Landsknechtes actions captured the

imagination of European youths and brought many of
them to the regiments as volunteers.

A peculiarity of mercenary organizations such
as the Landsknechtes was that drillmasters instructed
all the recruits for their operations in home gar-
risons. When the drillmasters tested and declared
their recruits competent for service, they moved into
the tactical ranks. New recruits immediately filled
the vacancies in the training classes of the drill-
masters. This was the beginning of the modern regi-
mental depot system.[15]

In 1505 King Ferdinand of Spain created twenty
units called "Colunelas" (columns), each consisting of
slightly over one thousand men organized into five com-
panies.[16] By the year 1535 the Spanish combined three
or more colunelas to create a larger organization
called the "Tercio." This new body, with an aggregate
strength of more than three thousand men, developed
many of the traditions found in the modern regiment.

The Maestro de Campo (Colonel) commanded the
Tercio, assisted by a Furriel Mayor (adjutant), a
Sarjeanto Mayor (major), and a number of other staff
officers to include a medical staff, thirteen chap-
lains, and a drum and fife band.[17]

During the years 1509 to 1520 the French ad-
miring the concepts of the Tercios, copied the suc-
cessful concepts of the colunelas to include the rank

of the commander. The French also organized perman-
ent regional units, initially called legions. With
reorganization, which occurred in France in 1558,
the legions became the French Regional Regiments, a
title and organization which survived with only minor
changes to the end of the eighteenth century.[18]

The colonel, now a permanent officer accepted
by monarchs and authorized by them to raise men, was
the proprietor of his own regiment. Initially, the
regiments organized to fight specific campaigns and
then disbanded. The dismissal of men who made a
living at war produced small bands who turned to ex-
tortion and robbery. The problems caused by these
outlaw bands made the idea of a standing army
increasingly popular and as a result the units were
no longer disbanded after every campaign. The regi-
ments maintained their troop strength by the regular
input of recruits from the regimental depot system.

In 1611 Gustavus Adolphus became Sweden's
king. Although he was an able general in battle, his
special talent was the creation of the military or-
ganization and his novel ideas on its employment.[19]
The Swedish regiment, with an average field strength
of eight hundred to one thousand men, used the musket
for firepower and as the basis of maneuver. Gustavus
organized Swedish regiments with two battalions,[20]
supported and equipped by the crown.[21]

In regiments of cavalry the cavalrymen referred to their battalions as squadrons or cornets.[22] In 1623 Gustavus formed his regiments into "Great Regiments" or "Brigades," each brigade consisted of three regiments.[23] The regiment again was an administrative organization controlling rewards, punishments, administration, supply and services. In the Swedish Army, every regimental commander read the articles of war to his men every month, punishment for breaches of discipline was severe. Swedish regimental commanders stressed continuous training, and Gustavus personally directed reorganization and improvement of equipment for the Swedish Army. The brigade was the tactical unit. The Swedes designed tactics to maximize musket fire, protect the formation from artillery, and allow the pikemen to protect the musketeers as they deployed, fired, and returned to the safety of the brigade formation to reload.

In 1624 Gustavus Adolphus introduced the first regimental artillery piece in history in the Swedish regiments. The Swedish regimental artillery piece had a cast iron barrel which weighed four hundred pounds. Gustavus placed one gun directly into each infantry regiment. The Swedish cannon required a crew of four and could be towed by one horse. This was the first regimental artillery because heretofore armies hired civilian artillerymen for specific engagements.

Gustavus Adolphus' innovations in the field of combined arms matched his improvements in the organizations of each arm of service. Under his leadership musketeers, infantry, cavalry, and artillery became mutually supporting. On November 16, 1632, at the Battle of Lutzen, Gustavus died while rallying his troops, but the Army he left became the model for the rest of Europe.[24]

Since 1569 there had been regiments of native born French professionals. In 1628 under the administration of Cardinal Richelieu, the twelve oldest French regiments received permanent status, never again to disband. They would only reduce their manpower during times of peace. However, the regiments prior to 1639 were still proprietary organizations owned by their colonels; the state provided nothing. There were no uniforms, no discipline, and no way to properly administer or influence the actions of the colonels. Cardinal Richelieu did not like the system of proprietary regiments but he had recognized that the "arrière-ban" (feudal peasant levy) was not the answer either.[25] Richelieu's solution, employed in 1639, was to pay the men by state commissioners. This system would prevent the embezzlement of soldier's pay by their officers and would provide a device for the monarchy to maintain its power over a loyal professional army.

In 1684 the French Minister of War, Marquis
Francois M. T. Louvois, placed the artillery into
separate regiments, finally ridding the military com-
manders of the civilian gunners who had fought any
attempts to alter their artillery tactics. Louvois
can also take credit for the formal organization of
battalions, subordinate to the regiment, and the
placement of the regiment entirely in the role of an
administrative unit. The French battalions, the tac-
tical organizations, had seventeen companies of sixty
men each. The French regiments, with up to six thou-
sand men, had three battalions in each regiment.[26]

Until the seventeenth century the English
monarchy found its strength in laws and customs. Bri-
tish citizens looked upon military forces as unneces-
sary on British soil until 1639, when a series of
quarrels developed between the Parliament and the king
which led to six years of civil war.[27] The problems
associated with the lack of a standing army and the
lack of money provided both sides with a stalemate.
Among the commanders of the parliamentary forces was
Oliver Cromwell. Cromwell's cavalry regiment provided
the decisive advantage[28] which led to the defeat of
the Royalist forces.

By February, 1645, Parliament established the
"New Model" Army with Cromwell in command created
around a nucleus of his cavalry. Cromwell organized

the "New Model" with eleven regiments of horse, one
regiment of dragoons, twelve regiments of infantry,
and an artillery train.[29] Colonels commanded the
British regiments. For the first time in British his-
tory, Parliament uniformed the entire Army in scarlet
tunics with colored facings representative of the
regiment's colors.[30] Cromwell formed his army around
a nucleus of trained professional soldiers, many of
whom were veterans of foreign armies. Cromwell's
regiments were both tactical and administrative units,
tactical regiments were a result of excluding the bat-
talion from early organization.

In 1647 Oliver Cromwell became Lieutenant
General of the Army, and the "New Model" became the
standing army of Parliament. It required another year
to defeat the Royalists. But with that victory came
the declaration that the "new army" was an army of
religious conviction dedicated to further the works of
the Puritan community.

In 1649 the execution of King Charles I oc-
curred with Cromwell's approval. Cromwell became the
uncrowned king and the Army of fifty thousand men be-
came the most formidable force in all of England,
Scotland, and Ireland. The Army was the enforcer of
Cromwell's policy and many English people considered
the Army as a betrayer of the Commonwealth.[31] A

period of chaos followed Cromwell's death in 1658, until Charles II ascended to the throne, but Cromwell's reign would never be forgotten and from that day forward an aversion to a standing army would govern the decisions of Parliament.

As the Empire grew, the Army grew. Parliament added regiments quietly and without fanfare because, unpopular though they were, there was a need for more regiments to protect British colonies.[32]

In 1689, during the war with France, the British monarch issued Royal warrants to add thirteen more regiments to the British Army. Growth of the British Army for the war with France brought about many inventions but very few organizational developments.

Until the 19th century Great Britain's Army was not a full time army organization, only the organizations of the separate regiments themselves.[33] In each regiment officers bought their commissions as if the regiment was a commercial company and the commissions were shares. The British named their regiments after the regiment's colonel. The names changed when their commanders changed.[34] During wartime, the British brought their battalions together and organized brigades to provide tactical organizations with a headquarters which a general or an admiral could command.[35] Men enlisted for life, and, when they could no longer

be of service, they could enter Chelsea Hospital, an old soldier's home established by the king. The soldier paid for everything he needed except for his weapon and ammunition. There were few barracks, so most men lived in public houses.[36] Each regiment purchased uniforms from a fund created from stoppages of pay. Not until 1707 did Parliament take action to standardize or oversee regimental uniform procurement. In all British regiments uniform funds were a source of income for the officers.

For a British Army officer, even in a fortress, a regiment was the center of administration. Each regiment had its agent who kept the books of financial transactions and the agent recorded every penny for each item needed in a regiment. Organizations above the regiments, such as the war office, consisted of only a few clerks to perform periodic checks of the regimental accounts. British historians have characterized the entire system of military finance as a system of fraud. They attributed its longevity to the fact that the state shared in the profit through control of the purchase system and the fact that it reduced the cost of operation of the regiments for the state. The government itself helped to make this reputation by withholding payments to regiments, sometimes for years, only to settle-up by a partial payment of the amount due.

There was no permanent organization of British artillery until the year of 1716; and it was 1727 before the first royal regiment of British artillery formed. Prior to 1716 the Master General of the Ordnance ran an organization separate from the forces. This unit provided the artillery trains, partly crewed by civilians. The first attempts to train qualified artillerymen did not receive serious attention until 1741, when the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, opened to teach gunnery and engineering.[37]

The British regimental system was hardly worthy of emulation by today's standards. However, we must remember three important motives. First, it was basically a good system for its time, with little cost to the state. The British Army was an established institution, forged by frequent wars into an experienced, and well organized military instrument.[38] Second, it was the system that the people of the British colonies knew best.[39] It was a system behind which lay more than a century of military history and tradition. Third, the regimental system was capable of operation for regulars or militia. The system possessed the leading features of organization and tactics of Europe and the experience of the Indian warfare of the colonies tested in both regular and militia organizations.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGIMENT
IN AMERICA TO 1898

In the new world almost every British colony
found it essential to create a militia based upon the
principle of military obligation.[1] The colonists of
the new world experienced quite a different form of
threat from the Indians than the people of Europe had
ever known. From the first day of the landings of
the Virginia Company at Jamestown in 1607, the set-
tlers formed themselves into three groups: one group
to construct fortifications, one group as planters
and guards, and the third group to explore.[2] By 1623
it became a statutory requirement to bear arms and
muster for military duty on call. Militiamen elected
their company officers and formed companies numbering
from sixty-five to two hundred men.

In 1636 the General Court of Massachusetts Bay
organized Massachusetts companies into the colonies
first regiments, the North, East and Boston regiments.[3]
The colonists attempted to follow the example of the
British regimental system for militia organizations.

Pennsylvania was an exception to the practice
of organizing militia because of the Quaker population's

abhorance to the use of force. This changed in 1747
when, after threats by privateers, Benjamin Franklin
organized Pennsylvania non-Quakers into a volunteer
organization of some ten thousand men.[4]

Occasional emergencies demanded the use of
expeditionary forces and these forces came from vol-
unteer, impress, or draft systems. The recruits ob-
tained their training from the militiamen in the
training companies of the regiments. After training
and testing their recruits the militiamen shipped the
recruits off with the expedition. The militiamen who
did the training and recruiting stayed at home to
guard the hearth. The effectiveness of these forces,
both parent militia regiments and the expeditionary
forces, was inferior enough to enforce the claims for
the necessity of regular forces to fight the French
in 1754.[5]

Major General Edward Braddock became Commander-
in-Chief of all military forces on the North American
continent on April 14, 1755. Braddock brought with him
two regiments of Irish infantry, the 44th and the 48th
of foot, totalling fourteen hundred fifty men. Two more
regiments, the 50th and 51st from local recruitment
joined Braddock's forces by June, 1755. By fall, 1736,
a new oversize regiment formed locally, designated the
Royal Americans, or the 60th Regiment.[6] By 1757

recruiting for British regiments in the colonies be-
came impossible. The resulting shortage of manpower
forced the British to send additional regiments from
England.

The type of warfare encountered by British
forces was different than that warfare for which they
had been trained. However, the British regular did
well enough to make an unforgettable impression on the
colonists who formed their army of regiments along the
lines of the British regulars.[1]

The colonists had quarreled with Great Britain
for a number of years. The quarrels did not begin to
gain in intensity until after 1773. By the summer of
1774 some military preparations were begun which re-
sulted in the creation of a committee of safety by the
Provincial Congress of Massachusetts Bay on October
26, 1774. On April 19, 1775, the committee of safety
issued a circular letter which called for the enlistment
of an army. On the very next day, April 20, 1775, the
committee authorized a strength of eight thousand men.
They organized their companies on the British pattern
into regiments of ten companies each.

On June 14, 1775, the Second Continental Con-
gress authorized the first muster of troops to assist
forces of militia and minutemen who had assembled at
the call of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. The

Continental forces, under the command of Major General
Artemas Ward, laid siege to Boston held by the British
garrison.[8]   The troops authorized by the Continental
Congress were to be under the command of Colonel George
Washington who previously had been the commander of a
regiment of Virginia militia. The Continental Con-
gress commissioned Washington as a general and placed
him in command of all Continental forces. General
Washington moved to Boston on June 23, 1775.[9]

On June 30, 1775, the Continental Congress
adopted, after modification, the British Articles of
War for governing the initial authorization of troops.
The American Army of 1775 had thirty-eight regiments,
all slightly different in organization,[10]   Washington
was unable to correct the differences in regimental
organization because the Continental Congress author-
ized each state to organize its regiments as they saw
fit before his appointment. In addition, the British
system which the Americans copied organized battalions,
brigades, and divisions only in wartime. In peace-
time British colonels controlled their organizations
with the support of the home counties or districts.
The British Army organization remained the same until
1889 when the British adopted a number of reforms to
improve their Army and to provide a system to support
peacetime rotation of troops to the colonies.

The differences in organization of Continental regiments re·   red General Washington to organize the regiments into brigades of six regiments each. Washington combined two brigades to form a division and the resulting three divisions were approximately equal in size.

By the spring of 1776, in a reorganization of the Continental Army, ten original companies from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia became the First Continental Regiment. Washington, now a Major General, reasoned that the regiments should be designated not by their respective provincial numbers, but by a Continental nomenclature which would also elevate them above the status of a state militia. Washington's reasoning did not survive the actions of Congress when faced with the crisis of impending loss of the Continental Army due to the expirations of enlistments and the resolve of the British in 1776. Congress dropped the Continental numbering system.[11]

In its actions to man the Army on September 16, 1775, Congress used the nomenclature of "battalions" as equivalent to regiments in assigning quotas for manpower directly to the states. Congress designated the number of companies within the regiment at ten, in the British pattern, but used the word battalion as a measurement of that portion of an infantry regiment that was a

tactical fighting force. Congress also charged the
states with responsibility to commission the officers
of the "battalions" and recruit the enlisted men.[12]
A battalion, as an American tactical formation, was a
force of about one hundred sixty files[13] of infantry-
men. The regiments of the Continental Army were under
state control and as a result organized differently in
accordance with state directives with any number of
men, from three hundred to as high as one thousand.
It became easier for Congressmen to refer to the mini-
mum requirements of the battalion sized organization.[14]
Congressmen used the term regiment only to disouss the
administrative unit.[15]

The key tactical units of the American Army
in the Revolutionary War were battalions. Armies to
this point, in fact through the Civil War, fought as
a tactical whole, maneuvering by battalions. A force
would align on the battlefield in a massive formation
of subordinate organizations. The force would engage
the enemy for the neutralization or destruction of a
primary group of forces or an objective. When the
force commander wanted to turn, to advance, or to con-
centrate the power of his force he moved, or adjusted
the force by individually maneuvering his battalions.

American Regimental regulations were not stan-
dardized until Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben assumed

the duties of Inspector General in 1778. He organized
the regiments into training battalions of two hundred
men each and at that point the regiments and bat-
talions ceased to be identical. The battalions be-
came the standard maneuver unit.[16] Steuben's next
contribution was to write the first official American
military manual in 1779 entitled, Regulations for the
Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States.

The artillery and engineers organized differ-
ently from the rest of the forces. They served under
immediate Continental inspection not under state
supervision as the regiments of infantry and deployed
by company or smaller sized unit. In 1776 there were
four regiments of artillery authorized with ten or
more companies in three of the artillery regiments
and eight companies in the other.[17]

Continental regiments received their support
entirely from their home states. There were no depot
systems for recruits or supplies. Each state govern-
ment determined the equipment of its regiments, for
this reason they varied in strength, equipment and
training. Regiments were poorly supplied, ill-
equipped, and weak in engineers, cavalry, and artil-
lery.

Washington observed a gradual but determined
destruction of his army after the surrender of
Cornwallis in October, 1781. The soldiers were going

home and by the signing of the peace treaty, barely
seven hundred men remained. For the next three years
Congress could not agree on the form of organization
or the maximum size of the Army, or if it should be
permanent and professional or militia.[18]

On June 2, 1784, Congress instructed Henry
Knox, the senior military officer remaining in the
American Army, to discharge all but eighty enlisted
men and a proportionate number of company grade of-
ficers. Congress also ordered the eighty men to
guard military stores at West Point and Fort Pitt.
With this action Congress ended any possibility for
future regiments to draw on the traditions of the
Continental regiments since the ties of lineage were
completely severed in all cases except one. Today
only the Fourth Battalion, 5th Artillery claims a des-
cent directly from a Continental regiment. This unit
with its connection to Alexander Hamilton's provincial
company of New York artillery, organized in 1776, now
ranks as the oldest organization in the Regular Army.[19]

Congress reorganized the Army of seven hundred
men on the following day, June 3, 1784. When the re-
organization of the Army occurred, the first American
regiment consisted of ten companies eight infantry and
two artillery. The mission of the regiment from 1783
to 1790 was to provide troops to man the former British
frontier garrisons. The term of service was for one

year.[20]   Congress renewed the state quotas annually
and only the aggregate strength of the force changed.

In April, 1790, with the Indian relations
deteriorating, Congress authorized an increase to
fifty-seven officers and twelve hundred sixteen en-
listed men.[21]   This increase encouraged Governor
Arthur St. Clair of the Northwest Territory to mount
an expedition to punish the Miami Indians for their
attacks on settlers.   Governor St. Clair's expedition
resulted in disaster; the Indians killed half of his
forces and scattered the others.

St. Clair's defeat necessitated a reorgani-
zation of the Army into the Legion of the United
States on March 5, 1792.   The Legion of the United
States consisted of four sublegions of twelve hundred
eighty men each, commanded by brigadier generals.
Each sublegion consisted of two battalions of infan-
try, one battalion of riflemen, one company of dra-
goons,[22] and one company of artillerymen.   Majors com-
manded the battalions; the rank of colonel temporarily
disappeared.   Using Steuben's book of regulations and
constant training, the legion became an effective
fighting force and remained as a standing army until
May, 1796, when the Army abandoned the legionary
designations in favor of conventional regimental
designations.[23]   In addition, Congress voted the four

regiments, formerly called sublegions, an increase in
strength and authorized six troops of dragoons.[24]

On March 16, 1802, the Army experienced another
reorganization which reduced fighting forces to two
regiments of infantry and one artillery regiment of
four battalions.[25] Each artillery battalion consisted
of five companies.

By April, 1808, Congress, concerned over Indian
unrest, authorized an increase in the regular establish-
ment to 774 officers and 9,147 enlisted men. Congress
specified that the Army's new organization included
seven infantry regiments, one rifle regiment, one
light artillery regiment, and one regiment of dragoons.[26]

With the opening shots of the War of 1812, less
than seven thousand regulars filled the authorized
positions. To provide protection for frontier settlers
three regiments, the 1st Infantry, 4th Infantry, and
5th Infantry covered the forts from the Great Lakes to
the border of Ohio and Indiana. The 2d Infantry was
in New Orleans, the 3d Infantry in Georgia and on the
Florida frontier, the 6th Infantry covered the south-
west, and the 7th Infantry Regiment protected the
citizens of Kentucky. The Army used the regiment of
dragoons as infantry, and the artillery covered the
map from Maine to Georgia. Withdrawal of regular

units from the frontier was an invitation to the
Indians to raid frontier settlements and massacre
frontiersmen.[27]

Even though Congress authorized an addi-
tional increase in the active force to twenty-five
thousand, less than one fifth of the strength of
the added regiments was immediately recruited. On
June 26, 1812, Congress authorized an additional
increase which included: twenty-five regiments of
infantry, four regiments of artillery, two regiments
of dragoons, and one regiment of rifles.[28] By the
end of June, Congress reconfigured the infantry and
artillery regiments to 10 companies each but not
enough men enlisted to fill more than one-third of
the positions.[29] The contributions that American
Army units made in the land battle came primarily
from state militia regiments. The effectiveness of
those organizations was such that it can be said that
except for the commands of Generals Harrison, Brown,
Scott, and Smith, the war ended due to the efforts of
the Navy and a negotiated peace.

As for the development of the regiments, in
March, 1815, the system underwent another destructive
act of legislation which further complicated an al-
ready damaged change of lineage. The legislators
twisted what few traditions and esprit that the regi-
ments retained into a puzzling maze.[30] The force of

forty-eight infantry regiments declined to a maximum
authorized strength of ten thousand reorganized into
a force of eight regiments of infantry. Congress
also authorized one rifle regiment of ten companies
and one regiment of light artillery. To organize
this force, Congress formed five or six regiments,
which were in each of the eight military districts
into one infantry regiment per military district.
The newly formed eight regiments received new num-
bers corresponding to the seniority of the colonel
commanding the regiment. These numbers still exist.[31]

Equipment improvements were slow in getting
into the hands of the troops. Although in 1808
Napoleon's horse drawn artillery appeared briefly
in the Army, President Madison's Secretary of War
decided that the horses used in this unit were a
waste of money and sold them. A few units became
mounted briefly during the War of 1812, but not until
1838 did light artillery reappear. The reorganization
of 1821 provided one "light" company for each of the
four artillery regiments but the legislation did not
provide the money for the equipment.

The Army published a new set of regulations
called The Military Laws and Rules and Regulations
for the Armies of the United States in 1813. In

general, except for a few minor developments in equipment, administrative and logistical support for the regiments, and with the retention of a nucleus of veterans, the regiments were back where they started before the war.

Military legislation of 1821 directed Secretary of War John C. Calhoun to reduce the Regular Army to 5,586 enlisted men. The same legislation consolidated the 6th Infantry with the Rifle Regiment, eliminated the 8th Infantry and consolidated the Corps of Artillery, the Light Artillery Regiment, and the Ordnance Department into four regiments of artillery.[32]

The General Regulations for the Army; or, Military Institutes, published in 1821, specify the minimum strength of a company as twenty-eight. The practice dictated by the regulation was to designate a recruiting party from the company and transfer everyone else to another company within the regiment. When the company commander and his recruiting party returned with their complement of new recruits, the colonel could, if he desired, transfer the old soldiers back to the company.[33]

The period from 1821 to 1835 was extremely difficult for the Army. The regiments had to continue to perform their tasks and the tasks of men lost because of reductions in authorizations by Congress. The

companies of the regiments were so widely dispersed
that concentrations of regimental organizations for
defensive operations was impossible. The Indians
were quick to recognize the Army's plight and fre-
quently raided frontier settlements.[34] The disper-
sion of forces was further aggravated by the shortage
of horses, resulting from austerity. Not until March
2, 1833, did the Army receive authority from Congress
to revive a regiment of dragoons.

By 1835 the strength of the Army had fallen
to slightly more than 4,000 out of an authorized
strength of 7,198. That small force nevertheless
guarded over 10,000 miles of seacoast and frontier
for a population that had grown to over 15,000,000
people. A force of 536 regular soldiers was all
that was available for operations against hostile
Indians in Florida.

On December 28, 1835, an ambush by Seminole
Indians, called "Dade's Massacre," resulted in the
loss of 107 regular officers and men, and the reali-
zation by Congress that the small forces of the regi-
ments needed more manpower. By 1837 the Seminole War
absorbed nine of the fourteen regular regiments. On
May 23, 1836, Congress authorized an additional regi-
ment of dragoons and ten thousand emergency troops

for six or twelve months.[35] However, poor performance
of militiamen resulted in further action by Congress
in 1838 to strengthen the regular forces.

In 1838 Joel R. Poinsett, President Van Buren's
Secretary of War, ordered the purchase and issue of
equipment for one light artillery company. The first
light artillery company organized in 1838 was "C"
Company, 3d Artillery, commanded by Brevet Major
Samuel Ringgold. Secretary Poinsett organized a
demonstration of Army units and equipment at Trenton,
New Jersey, which included invitations to members of
the press. Major Ringgold's company put on such a
fine show that on July 7, 1838, Congress authorized
three more "mounted" light companies, totalling
twenty-four guns. Congress also created the 8th
Infantry Regiment by adding another regiment of in-
fantry to the Regular Army and authorized one regi-
ment of infantry to be equipped with rifles. The
four companies of artillery remained until the Mexican
War as the United States Army's only field artillery.[36]

In 1842 Congress again reduced the strength
of the Army. However, the numbers of regiments, com-
panies, and commissioned officers remained unchanged
even though congressional actions reduced the enlisted
strength.[37] Life, for the private soldier returned to
the prewar routines of guard duty, ceremonies, and

details from reveille to taps. The call to arms fre-
quently interrupted daily routines at frontier posts
as civilization crept westward. The life style of
western campaigns, and the battles in the southwest
with Seminole and Creek warriors, made the regular
regiments units of fighters.[38]

The Regular Army received the bulk of the
credit for the successful conduct of the Mexican War
because the regular regiments fought the initial
battles without assistance from the militia.[39] Be-
fore the militia could be a help, legislation was
necessary to increase the terms of service. When
the legislation did provide for more permanence,
volunteer regiments provided the largest propor-
tionate service.[40]

Congress acted on legislation affecting the
size and organization of the Army eight times from
1846 to 1848. By 1848 the legislators learned some
lessons about the militia and the Regular Army. The
most important lessons were that state militia regi-
ments had decreased in reliability, proficiency, and
responsiveness. State militiamen fought the Revo-
lutionary War with a token contribution of volunteers
and a regular establishment which represented a frac-
tion of the total force. In the War of 1812, the
percentage of state militiamen decreased and volunteer

participation began to increase. By the Mexican War, participation of volunteers was double that of the regular regiments and six times that of the state militia. In addition, the volunteer regiments resembled the regular regiments more than the state militia regiments. Volunteer regiments had ten companies totalling approximately eleven hundred men to a regiment. The state militia regiments had from two hundred men to two thousand since the state could organize their regiments to fit their own needs. As far as the structure of the regiment, it was about the same as it had been in 1812. only the aggregate personnel strength changed and the states mounted a larger portion of the total force.

Congress designed the reorganization legislation of August 14, 1848, to bring the Army back to peacetime levels. Congress authorized eight regiments of infantry, four regiments of artillery, two regiments of dragoons, and one regiment of rifles. With the exception of an increase of 147 officers, the Army was smaller by 2,222 men than it had been in 1838.[41]

One of the results of having won the Mexican War was the acquisition of 960,000 square miles of new territory. With this new territory, the Army needed regular regiments everywhere. Initially the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Infantry Regiments moved to Pass Christian,

Louisiana. The 5th Infantry Regiment moved to the
Indian territories and constructed forts Gibson, Smith,
Washita, and Towson. The 6th Infantry, 7th Infantry,
8th Infantry, and the Mounted Rifle Regiments went to
Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. The 1st and 2d Artil-
lery went to Governors Island, New York, the 3d and
4th Artillery went to Fort Monroe, Virginia. There
were three companies of the 1st Dragoons, seven com-
panies of the 2d Dragoons, and eight companies of
artillery stationed on the Rio Grande.[42] The 3d Dra-
goons returned to the United States and transferred
the bulk of their equipment to the 1st Dragoons. All
but two of the light mounted batteries of artillery
dismounted, and the Army transferred or sold the
mounts. The light artillery was not as cost effective
as dragoons or infantry on the frontier against the
Indians. Therefore, with the exception of only seven
batteries, the Army used artillerymen primarily as
infantrymen until the Civil War.

Due to the Army's success in Mexico, Congress
made little change in its organization, but the
legislators closely watched sectional balance and
efforts to keep growing untert away from the Army
could have been strong reason.[43] Whatever the true
reason, neither the Congress nor the Army attempted

changes to modernize the organizations or equipment.
The Army did not revise General Regulations for the
Army, 1847, until 1861, and then Northern and
Southern forces rewrote their regulations separately.[44]
The organization of the Army and the regiments within
changed only once before 1861.

On March 3, 1855, Congress increased the number of infantry regiments to ten. In addition, Congress added two regiments of dragoons and two regiments of cavalry.[45] By far the most important change was the provision that the President could, when he desired, increase any of the companies from the old authorization of forty-two to a strength of seventy-four privates. Authorized strength went to a maximum of 18,318. Enlistment periods changed to five years, officers received extra pay of $20.00 per day and enlisted men received double pay for service outside of the United States.[46]

The Secretary of the Army, in his 1858 report, provided the best summary of Army activities for the decade of 1850 to 1860 that is available.[47]

> It may be safely asserted that no army of the
> same size ever before performed, in such a
> length of time, marches and movements of such
> extent, surmounting in their progress such
> formidable obstacles. These regiments have
> accomplished within the year a march, aver-
> aging for each the extraordinary distance of
> twelve hundred and thirty-four miles. These
> marches, in the main, have been made through
> the uninhabited solitudes and sterile deserts
> which stretch away between the settlements of

the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, upon routes
which afforded nothing to facilitate the ad-
vance, except only the herbage which the
beasts of burden might pluck by the wayside.
Every item of supply, from a horseshoe nail
to the largest piece of ordnance, has been
carried from the depots, along the whole
line of those tedious marches, to be ready
at the exact moment when necessity might
call for them. The country traversed could
yield nothing. The labor, forsight, method
and care requisite to systematize, and the
energy, activity, and persistence to carry
out such operations by the different depart-
ments, deserve the attention of the country
and, in my opinion, its commendation too.
No disaster has befallen the army throughout
its immense ramifications; and the privations,
hardships, toils and dangers to which it has
been continually subjected, have been borne
without a murmur.

The nation entered the Civil War with the same
basic system of regimental organizations inherited
from the British modified only by the experiences of
war with Britain, Mexico, and the Indian nations. How
well the Army applied those modifications is question-
able. The US Army Regulations governing army organi-
zation and tactics were archaic by anyone's standards
and yet only twice during the Civil War were major
changes made to incorporate changes in the laws passed
by the Congress.[48] The southern forces were no better
off when it came to regulation, Colonel William
Gilham's, Manual for Confederate Volunteers and Mili-
tia, was strikingly similar to the federal regulations.

In 1861, before he called for the first levy,
President Lincoln consulted the War Department as to
the best organization for new regular regiments as
well as volunteer regiments. The Secretary of War
turned the matter over to Salmon P. Chase, Secretary
of Treasury because he was too busy to handle it.
Secretary Chase recommended regiments of three bat-
talions, a French system. Two battalions remained
in the field and the third operated a regimental depot
to recruit and train replacements. Eight hundred men
were in each battalion of the new regiments. This
was large enough to withstand attack by cavalry and
small enough that when organized in eight companies
the battalion could be commanded by one man using
voice. The French believed that a regiment was an
administrative organization, that it could handle
more than one battalion, and that the battalions
were the best tactical units.[49]

On May 4, 1861, the War Department published
General Orders for the volunteers and the regular ad-
ditions outlining the plans of organization. Con-
gress only authorized the new additions to the Regular
Army to organize in the three battalion regimental
structure. At this point the Army had three different
regimental organizations in the infantry.[50] The
volunteer regiments with 866 to 1,046 officers and

men authorized, the 1st through the 10th Infantry
with maximum authorized of 878 officers and men, and
the 11th through the 19th wich 2,020 to 2,452 of-
ficers and men authorized. The General Orders also
affected cavalry units, the volunteer cavalry regi-
ments consisted of four, five, or six squadrons of
two companies each. The regular cavalry regiments
consisted of three battalions. Each cavalry bat-
talion consisted of two squadrons and each squadron
consisted of two companies. The aggregates for both
volunteer cavalry and regular cavalry regiments were
about equal to each other. The General Orders which
authorized the organizations for the regiments also
directed the formation of brigades with once again a
difference between regulars and volunteers, two regi-
ments to a regular brigade, four regiments to a volun-
teer brigade.[51]

The organization of the Army under the acts
of July 29 and August 3, 1861, included nineteen regi-
ments of infantry, six regiments of cavalry, and five
regiments of artillery, with a maximum strength of
44,893 officers and enlisted men.[52]

On August 10, 1861, in General Orders No. 55,
the dragoons, the mounted riflemen, and the cavalry
consolidated in the same corps. The units became the
1st through 6th Cavalry.[53] Strange as it might seem,

the dragoons and riflemen resisted the changes, they claimed that the changes had a demoralizing effect because with the re-naming of the regiments, the traditions and honors attached to the old regiments would be lost. The dragoons and riflemen also disliked the uniform change, the piping on a cavalry uniform was yellow, the dragoons had worn orange piping and the mounted riflemen green piping. Insignia also changed slightly, but as an economy measure the Army authorized the dragoons and riflemen to keep their old uniforms until they wore out.[54]

After the war had begun Congress made few changes in regimental organization despite the fact that the Army recognized the old regimental organization as unsuitable for tactical formations. Improved firearms forced units to disperse and officers frequently lost control. Once deployed, a one battalion regiment was too big for one man and his staff. This was the leading cause of officer casualities because the only way to maintain control was for the officers to place themselves where all their men could see them. Unfortunately, these actions exposed commanders for enemy sharpshooters. After the Civil War, Major General John M. Schofield said, "The cumbersome regimental organization had only worked in the course of the war because the replacement system was faulty."

What General Schofield meant was that because the strength of the regiments fell rapidly, and there were few replacements, they soon reached a size that a colonel and his staff could handle. Companies had the same problem, the practices of organizing an interior structure of platoons, sections, and squads had not occurred in spite of their appearance in manuals as early as 1850.[55]

Officers described planning at regimental level as crisis management. The regimental staff designed for administrative operations could not effectively manage both the administration and the tactical planning to maintain operations.

The Army provided recruits for regular regiments after 1861 from two principal depots for the general recruiting service. Recruiters sent the recruits for regular infantry regiments to Fort Columbus, New York. They also sent cavalry recruits to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Regimental commanders detailed officers from the regiments to recruit personnel in areas designated by the Adjutant General. Recruiting details sent their recruits in parties to the depots where they received some basic training and were given their basic issue of uniforms and equipment. Depot commanders sent the recruits to their assigned regiments from the depots using Army transportation or a

representative from their assigned regiment picked them up from the depots.[56] In addition, the Adjutant General authorized regiments to recruit locally and conduct training in one of the companies.[57]

Both the North and the South failed to develop a good system to replace men in volunteer units. When a unit's strength diminished to a prescribed level, the shortage of personnel forced commanders to send men back to their home states on recruiting duty or they had the alternative of consolidating with another unit. In many cases army commanders disbanded regiments when reduced by combat losses. Northern governors preferred to raise new regiments because this gave them political patronage through the appointment of officers. The dilatorious effect of this system is obvious since untrained civilians officered the new regiments rather than persons with combat experience.

A review of the General Orders for the Union Army indicates that except for the 5th regiment of artillery, Congress raised no other regular artillery regiments for the Civil War. Eventually two batteries (term battery accepted in 1861) joined each regular artillery regiment providing a total of sixty batteries in the five regiments. Legislation clearly stated that the additional batteries were only

authorized in time of war. However, upon cessation of hostilities these batteries remained until the reorganization of July 28, 1866.

In the first six months of the Civil War, army commanders attached the artillery by batteries to infantry or cavalry regiments or to brigades. Later when large northern armies organized and deployed, commanders recognized the system as inadequate for either administrative or tactical reasons.[58] With the assumption of command of General McClellan, he wrote organizational principles which placed four batteries in each division removing them from the brigade control. At least one of the four batteries was a regular battery; the other three were volunteer. McClellan designated the captain of the senior regular battery of each division as commander of the division artillery.

By May, 1863, divisions relinquished control of the artillery to army corps. This action resulted in the formation of artillery brigades, commanded by captains and considered equal in firepower to divisions. Army corps commanders assigned artillery at a ratio of three pieces per thousand men.[59] The number of batteries in an artillery brigade varied from four to nine. Again each artillery brigade included at least one regular battery. The artillery regimental

headquarters provided administrative and logistical
support but was seldom a tactical influence.

In 1863 the Corp d'Afrique appeared, in 1864
the organization became the U. S. Colored Troops, of-
ficered and organized under direct authority of the
federal government. Initially, Negro regiments began
as state units of battalion size, but with the excep-
tion of two Massachusetts regiments, all Negro regiments
mustered into Federal service. Four Indian regiments
joined the Federal organization in much the same manner.

From its reorganization on August 3, 1861, the
Regular Army strength was never more than twenty-six
thousand until the reorganization of 1865.[60] In fact,
because of the preferences of the recruits for the
larger bonuses, and the easy-going atmosphere of the
volunteer regiments, the newly authorized three bat-
talion regiments of regulars were never able to re-
cruit enough men to fill all of the battalions.

It was the volunteer regiments that provided
the majority of the forces for the northern armies in
the Civil War. During the course of the war the
Northern Army organized approximately 1,700 regi-
ments of infantry, 272 regiments of cavalry, and 78
regiments of artillery. The Confederacy organized
approximately 572 regiments of infantry, 150 regi-
ments of cavalry, and 300 batteries of artillery.[61]

In both the North and South, state militia regiments often were regiments in name only. State militia mobilization organizations poorly trained and inadequately equipped their militia regiments. State militiamen still elected their leaders as they did in the Revolutionary War.

The Civil War gave birth to the "Staging" system of supply. The staging system was simply a system of giving the soldier a basic load of rations, which he was not to eat unless supply trains did not issue the daily rations. Every other day the regimental trains delivered rations. The regimental trains picked up their rations and ammunition from temporary magazines which "Supply Columns" serviced by picking up the supplies from the railhead. If the supply lines became too long, they just added in additional supply columns. Each company detailed men to make up the regimental trains led by the quartermaster officer and quartermaster sergeant.[62]

The regiments financed their operations through cash purchase vouchers and bills which they presented to the federal government through paymaster or quartermaster channels. State militia organizations and many state volunteer organizations channeled their bills back to their home states and the home states presented the bills to the federal government for payment.

With the end of the fighting Congress turned to the task of reducing the wartime Union Army to a peacetime force. The reorganization of July 28, 1866, was the highest authorization that Congress approved until the war with Spain in 1898. The reorganization of 1866 was the first of seven that took the Regular Army from an authorized strength approximating fifty-five thousand down to twenty-eight thousand by 1889.

By Act of Congress dated July 28, 1866, Congress increased the Army to forty-five infantry regiments, ten cavalry regiments and five regiments of artillery. All forty-five infantry regiments adopted the single battalion organization. A regimental headquarters and one battalion consisting of ten companies composed each regiment. Army leaders having recognized the value of the three battalion organizations requested a return to the three battalion regimental organization; however, Congress denied their requests. Colored Troops composed the 38th through the 41st Infantry and the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments. The 42d through the 45th Infantry Regiments constituted the Veteran Reserve Corps.[63] The Army formed new regiments by the expansion of battalions of the old 11th through 19th regiments that Congress had authorized in 1861.[64]

By the end of 1866 the reorganization was practically complete and the Secretary of War distributed

the regiments among the departments. Twelve batteries
composed each artillery regiment, ten were heavy bat-
teries, for seacoast fortification organized in two
battalions, and two were light batteries or field
artillery batteries. The Secretary of War attached
the field artillery batteries to the various depart-
ments. By 1870 there were still sixty batteries; how-
ever, Congress authorized only five of them for
organization and equipment as light artillery, the
Army armed and used the other fifty-five as infantry.

Changes in the equipment of the Army had been
traditionally slow. The large supply of equipment on
hand at the end of the Civil War was sufficient to
equip the regiments for a number of years further de-
laying improvements in equipment.

The soldiers who served during the years im-
mediately after the Civil War were mostly veterans.
As time passed, only a few of this group remained. An
assortment of immigrants filled their places, farm and
city boys who had not found a civilian job. Once he
had taken the oath, recruiters sent the recruit to a
training station for his introduction to the Army. At
Columbus Barracks, Ohio, drill instructors drilled the
infantry recruit. At Jefferson Barracks, Missouri,
the cavalry recruit learned how to groom a horse in
the regulation manner in addition to drill. Artillery

recruits trained at David's Island, Virginia. After
several weeks drill instructors sent these men to
their home regiments.

After the Civil War recruit depots moved
quite frequently. On October 4, 1866, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania, became the principal cavalry
depot for collecting and training recruits. In 1870
the Army established the cavalry depot at St. Louis
Arsenal, Missouri in the middle of what was then
horse country. In 1887 Congress appropriated $200,000
for a school to be located at Fort Riley, Kansas, to
train the recruits for cavalry and field artillery.
Five years went by before the Army opened the school
in 1892, but when it opened complete regimental troops
of cavalry and complete field artillery batteries
trained there with the recruits. Army regulations
required recruits sent to Fort Riley to complete their
training before joining a regiment.[65]

On March 3, 1869, Congress reduced the total
number of infantry regiments to twenty-five and elimi-
nated the four regiments of the Veteran Reserve Corps.
Only the 1st through the 10th regiments escaped the
immediate effects of this legislation. The Army
formed the remaining fifteen regiments by consolidation
and redesignation of what had been thirty-five regi-
ments.

The reduction in the size of the Army in 1869 placed the Army in the same situation that it faced in the period of 1821 to 1835. Within the regiments the size of companies fluctuated. In the midst of an economic depression the number of men authorized in an infantry company dropped in 1876 to as low as thirty-seven. The commanders pointed out that when sickness and desertion occurred, the little companies were too small to do their duty in the Indian country where the Army stationed one hundred eighty out of two hundred fifty of the companies.

One month after the massacre of Custer's troops in June, 1876, Congress again reduced the enlisted strength of the Army. Then in August, 1876, Congress authorized the existing cavalry units to be augmented by twenty-five hundred men. The army commanders considered cavalry the best force for use against the Plains Indians. Because of that belief, the June reductions fell almost entirely on the infantry and the artillery to compensate for the cavalry augmentation.[66]

The state militia organizations that had existed since the colonial period had further degenerated. The volunteer organizations which bore the brunt of the fighting in the Civil War were the real militia behind the regular force. A martial enthusiasm of the

period maintained the volunteer organizations. They
also attracted men because the regiments were frater-
nal groups that appealed to the manly virtues of
physical fitness, duty, and discipline. The volun-
teer regiments attracted many because they thought
of the regiments like social clubs whose members
enjoyed a local prestige. In 1879 the National Guard
Association came into being in St. Louis, Missouri.
Between 1881 and 1892 every state revised its military
code to provide for a National Guard organization. By
1898 the National Guard Regiments were the principal
reserve behind the Regular Army.

The Army fought its last Indian battle of any
significance at Wounded Knee Creek, South Dakota, in
1890. The abatement of the Indian problem made it
possible to abandon some of the smaller posts and con-
centrate the units under regimental control. The Army
stripped two companies from each infantry regiment of
all personnel and used the officers and men to fill out
the remaining companies. Fifty infantry companies
existed in name only, their records, trophies, and
guidons preserved by the regiments headquarters.

While activities to consolidate were in pro-
gress, members of the administration and of the Army
were again arguing that the ten company single bat-
talion regiment was obsolete. The Secretary of War

and Army generals based the principal arguments on
the experience of the United States Army in the
Civil War and the experience of European nations.
In the Civil War the Army learned that with the in-
creased accuracy of firearms, dispersion necessary
to reduce casualties prevented one man from control-
ling ten companies in battle. Wars in Europe had
demonstrated that one-third of a regiment now oc-
cupied the same front in battle as an entire regiment
once had. If everyone accepted this, legislators
could not expect a single leader to direct more than
four companies in action. The Army, therefore, re-
quested that Congress authorize a three battalion
regimental organization to take effect as soon as
possible. The Army repeated its request annually
without success until during preparations for war with
Spain the request received some attention.

On March 8, 1898, in preparation for war, Con-
gress added two regiments of artillery to the Regular
Army organization and reorganized the existing artil-
lery regiments.[67] Following the actions to improve
the artillery on April 26, 1898, Congress altered the
regimental system permanently by legislation. The
Army adopted a three battalion organization for in-
fantry, each regiment composed of two battalions of
four companies each, and of two skeleton, or unmanned

companies. Upon declaration of war by the Congress, the President had the authority to authorize the organization of a third battalion, to be composed of the two skeleton companies and two additional companies. This same legislation increased the company of infantry to a maximum strength of 250 enlisted men. The legislation also increased field artillery batteries to a maximum of 173 enlisted men.

On April 22, 1898, Congress passed an act declaring the active land forces to consist of the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army of the United States. This action further apportioned the Volunteer forces to the states and directed that their organizations be directed by the Secretary of War during wartime.

The entry of the United States Army into the Spanish American War marked the beginning of the end to the army of regiments. The conflicts in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Manila had ended quickly. However, many Americans realized that the victories were attributable more to the incompetence of the enemy than to any special qualities displayed by the Army.

The United States had now become a colonial power because of the war with Spain. The study of war grew in importance and Americans turned to a review of what they had to fight with and the organizations of the Army's forces.

CHAPTER 3

SELF-EXAMINATION AND CHANGE, 1898-1962

The Army's renaissance began with the appoint-
ment of a post war investigating commission by President
McKinley. The commission, headed by Major General
Grenville M. Dodge, brought out the serious need for
reform in Army administration, operations, and organi-
zation. The findings of the Dodge Commission were
especially important in light of the entry of the United
States into the role of a politically and militarily
prominent force upon the world stage.

From the experiences of the Spanish American
War, it was apparent that the best organization for an
army was that which serves both the tactical and admin-
istrative needs. This philosophy, coupled with the
growing deadliness of weapons, determined the direction
for improved organization. It was also clear that a
Regular Army of regiments could not constitute the
whole land defense establishment and that stimulation
of the militia was therefore necessary.

Many of the generals and regimental commanders
in the Spanish American War were veterans of the Civil

War. Some of these officers recognized that problems which had plagued them in the previous wars still existed. In fact, some problems had grown worse because the tradition rich regimental system had defied change. The problems experienced by the lack of an organization of replacement depots had grown. In addition, the lack of a mobilization depot system or any plans for that type of system was a major problem. They were popular subjects of controversy that would last until the Army finally cast the regiments aside. Even though regimental and higher commanders tried many arrangements, there never was a truly efficient regimental depot system for mobilization or for replacements.

In 1899 President McKinley appointed Elihu Root Secretary of War. Beginning in 1899 Root outlined in a series of masterful reports his proposals for fundamental reform of Army institutions and concepts to achieve that "efficiency" of organization and function required of armies in the modern world.

The reports of the Secretary of War from 1899 to 1901 urged establishment of a general staff and an Army War College to study organization, war plans, improvements in warfare, depot system organization for mobilization, and to develop a means to exercise and train the Army in the movements of large bodies of

troops. Root tasked the Army War College students to
design exercises to practice maneuver by brigade, di-
vision, and corps under conditions anticipated in
executing war plans developed by the proposed college.
Secretary Root criticized the promotion system of of-
ficers based upon seniority and written examinations.
The Secretary recommended centralized army promotion
boards and a central list rather than the system of
promotion within the regiments. He also urged the
development of a system that incorporated the officers'
efficiency reports.[1]

Secretary Root based his proposals partly upon
recommendations made by his military advisers and
partly upon the views expressed by officers who had
studied and written about the problem in the post-
Civil War years. Root arranged for publication of an
unfinished manuscript by Colonel Emory Upton which ad-
vocated a strong, expansible Regular Army as the key-
stone of an effective military establishment. Root's
conclusion was that the true object of the Army in
peacetime was "to provide for war." Root immediately
began to reorganize the American Army into an instru-
ment of national power capable of meeting the require-
ments of modern warfare.[2] Root believed the Army
could attain this objective by integrating the bureaus
of the War Department, the scattered elements of the

Regular Army, the militia, and volunteers, and by
developing a peacetime organization which focused
higher than the traditional regiments.

On February 2, 1901, Congress authorized an
increase in the Regular Army.[3] The Regular Army's
authorization now included thirty regiments of in-
fantry and fifteen regiments of cavalry. None of
the new regiments had any connection with any pre-
vious regiment bearing the same number. Congress
also authorized a Philippine Scout and a Puerto Rican
regiment.[4]

The General Staff published regulations for
the Army of the United States in 1901 to include a
comprehensive book of instructions which would insure
uniformity in both the regular and volunteer regiments.[5]
The regulations were careful throughout to emphasize
that the battalion was the fighting subdivision while
the regiment exercised administrative control over
three battalions.[6] The only fault in the transition
was that the American battalion was too small to per-
form its work. A comparison of the new organization
with those in Europe illustrated the problems of the
small American battalions.[7]

In 1902, because of improvements in conditions
in the Philippines, the Army underwent a slight reduc-
tion in force. More important was the implementation

of Secretary Root's long standing plans to close the
company sized posts and enlarge the major installa-
tions. Root believed that the larger concentrations
were more economical and larger concentrations in-
creased the efficiency of the men and the organiza-
tions by permitting closer supervision by higher
ranking officers. For years Root had attempted to
organize brigades and divisions in peacetime and he
saw this as an opportunity.

By 1903 the administration had distributed
the regiments of the United States Army with one-
third of their total force overseas. In addition to
the forces committed in the Philippines, the Army
located small detachments in Cuba, Puerto Rico, China,
Alaska, and Hawaii.

The United States had maintained troops over-
seas since 1898. Foreign service continued as a per-
manent part of Army life. Enlisted men recommended by
their commanders in the states served two year minimum
overseas tours during peacetime if they remained phy-
sically qualified. If they wished to extend they
could, but, had to submit a written request. Regiments
occasionally moved all or a portion of their unit over-
seas but when that occurred it was a permanent change
of station. Peacetime regiments, or battalions did
not rotate stations. Depots at Brooklyn, New York and

Fort McDowell, California handled individual replacements.[8]

In 1903 Congress passed an act which had tremendous impact on Army organization. The Dick Act thoroughly revised the obsolete Militia Act of 1792. It separated the militia into two classes--the Organized Militia, to be known as the National Guard, and the Reserve Militia--and provided that, over a five-year period, the guardsmen would pattern their organization and equipment after that of the Regular Army.[9]

Still, the largest permanent peacetime organization in the Regular Army continued to be the regiment. However, the Army published Field Service Regulations outlining plans for organization of divisions in wartime. By 1910 the General Staff completed plans for three permanent infantry divisions. The plans included mixing both Regular Army and National Guard regiments in the infantry divisions.

In 1907 the Artillery Reorganization Act separated the artillery into two arms, field and coast artillery. The act provided a separate regimental organization for the field artillery, leaving the coast artillery as a corps organized in separate companies. Congress increased the strength of both arms--the field artillery from thirty batteries to six regiments of six

batteries each, the coast artillery from 126 to 170
companies. In addition to the changes in organization,
legislation equipped the field artillery with rapid-
fire guns. Batteries within the regiment had four guns
each. With the new organization of six batteries in
each field artillery regiment, three were of light
(field) artillery proper, two of mountain or pack (mule)
artillery and one of horse artillery. With its new
organization and new equipment the field artillery
adopted new tactics for employment. In 1911 the Army
opened a School of Fire for Field Artillery, at Fort
Sill, Oklahoma.[10]

In February, 1908, the infantry organize an
experimental machine gun company. This company, al-
though it went through several changes in organization,
became the forerunner of the machine gun companies of
infantry regiments in World War I. The Army experi-
mentally added a headquarters detachment of seventeen
enlisted men and fifteen mounted scouts to each infan-
try regiment in 1912. With the machine gun platoon,
it made up a regimental detachment the parts of which
trained intensively in their specialized duties. By
1915 the headquarters detachment had grown into a pro-
visional headquarters company for each regiment of in-
fantry.[11] In the same manner, a machine gun platoon
added in 1906 became a machine gun company, while a

third new company, a supply ur.t, began a period of evaluation.

The size of infantry regiments varied, within the limits imposed by law on the President, according to the duty performed. Regiments in the United States in 1912 had sixty-five enlisted men per company, a regimental total of 870 men. While regiments serving in the Philippines had 150 men in each of their companies totalling 1,836 men in their regiments, those regiments assigned to Hawaii and the Canal Zone had strengths that were half that of Philippine regiments. The Puerto Rican Regiment had 165 men in each of its companies but because that regiment had only two battalions, it had a regimental total of 591 men.

By 1910 the Army of regiments had come a long way from that of the pre-Spanish-American War Army. Congressional legislation had roughly quadrupled the size of the regiments and completely re-equipped them. Many of the officers of the regiments had seen combat in Cuba or the Philippines and had received training in Fort Leavenworth's command and staff shcool. But essentially it was still the "same old Army," small, isolated, inbred and career oriented service. The Administration kept the regiments widely scattered in small posts which local politicians insisted on retaining, long after their military value had passed.

The term of enlistment was only three years but, the
regiments operated on a rigid caste system, in which
the enlisted men still addressed their officers in
the third person.

Cavalry, comprising one-fifth of the total
Regular force, served primarily on the Mexican border
until 1916. Two cavalry regiments also served in the
Philippines and one was in Hawaii. With this disper-
sion from 1911 to 1916, the Army still conducted vari-
ous experiments in cavalry reorganization and employ-
ment.

In 1911 the cavalry temporarily reorganized the
twelve-troop cavalry regiment into one of six troops
by consolidation of the troops in the old organization.
Cavalry officers believed that this action would result
in a more compact unit and bring all men within the
sound of the colonel's voice.

Plans for a more effective organization included
better location of the cavalry. Upon their return from
overseas, the Administration influenced the stationing
of cavalry units at posts established during the Indian
Wars, located far from centers of population and supply.
Most cavalry posts were small, and were in sections of
the country where climatic conditions made year round
outdoor work impracticable. As late as 1911 forty-nine
posts in twenty-four states and territories were still

in use. Thirty-one posts could not accommodate a
full regiment, six could accommodate little more
than a regiment, and only one was large enough for
a brigade. The average number of companies at a
post was nine or about six hundred fifty men.

During these years the Army made some changes
in the composition of the cavalry regiments. In 1912
the cavalry added a headquarters detachment and a
supply detachment to their regiment. By 1915 the
machine gun platoon, added in 1906, and the head-
quarters and supply detachments had become experi-
mental troops, and the next year they became permanent
troops. At the same time, the cavalry abandoned the
experimental organization of a six-troop regiment.

Thus, the cavalry regiment of 1916 had a head-
quarters, a headquarters troop, a supply troop, a
machine gun troop, and three squadrons. The three
squadrons of the cavalry regiment had four troops each.
All regiments had the usual complement of officers but
the number of enlisted men varied with the mission of
the regiment.[12] For example, the authorized enlisted
strength of regiments serving within the continental
United States was seventy men in a troop, while Con-
gress authorized regiments in the Philippine Islands
one hundred five enlisted men in each lettered troop.

The first attempt by the American Army to
actually concentrate a force larger than a regiment
in peacetime occurred in 1911. The success of the
attempt in 1911 is questionable. The concentration
did occur, but elements came from across the nation
and left many organizations too under manned to per-
form their missions. In 1913, with another emergency
generated by revolution in Mexico, the Army attempted
concentration of a division sized force again and was
relatively successful. In fact, the troops remained
on the Mexican border in the provisional division
organization until August, 1915. With stabilization
of political conditions in Mexico the Army gradually
withdrew the troops from the border.[13]

On June 3, 1916, in what was actually the cul-
mination of all such legislation since 1899, Congress
approved the National Defense Act.[14] The National
Defense Act of 1916, for the first time in United
States history, provided for the establishment of tac-
tical divisions in a peacetime army. The new Act
called for seven infantry divisions and two cavalry
divisions.[15] The Act authorized infantry divisions
to have three infantry brigades of three infantry regi-
ments and one artillery brigade of three field artil-
lery regiments. Infantry divisions also received one
regiment of cavalry and one regiment of engineers per

division. The legislation also authorized cavalry
divisions to have three cavalry brigades of three
cavalry regiments, one regiment of field artillery,
and one battalion of mounted engineers.

The Act changed brigades and divisions con-
siderably. However, infantry regiments remained
about the same within the three battalion structure.
cavalry regiments also retained their twelve lettered
troops in three squadrons.

The Defense Act officially accepted the pro-
visional companies, that is the headquarters, supply,
and machine gun companies that had existed in the
cavalry and infantry regiments. This meant that the
Army could now recruit and train personnel especially
for these units. Previously the regiments filled the
three provisional companies by taking personnel from
other companies in the regiment. The Defense Act also
increased the strength of the field artillery regiments
by the addition of a headquarters and supply company
to each regiment.[16]

Congress authorized five years to meet the
requirements of the new Defense Act. But, unfortunately,
the Army did not organize one of the tactical divisions
authorized before the declaration of war in 1917.

Until World War I, Congress retained the direct
responsibility for organization. In World War I, Con-
gress delegated the responsibility for organization of

the expeditionary Army to General John J. Pershing.
General Pershing assumed the duties as Commander-in-
Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.)
on May 26, 1917.[17] He departed for France immediately
and began to establish command and staff procedures
before the arrival of the first combat units.

Prior to June, 1917, the Army did not have an
American Field Army General Staff organized for war.
Pershing selected the best features of the British and
French systems and with the selection of Major General
James G. Harboard as his chief of staff, Pershing
organized the American Expeditionary Forces general
staff. General Pershing's next task was to devise his
combat organizations.

Observation of the warfare in Europe for three
years convinced the Americans that the American Army's
tables of organization were obsolete. Pershing called
the new divisions "square" divisions because they con-
tained two brigades of two regiments each.[18] Because
of the requirements of trench warfare, the aggregate
personnel strength of regiments went from 2,302 to
3,720 enlisted men. Pershing organized the infantry
regiments with three battalions each. Infantry bat-
talions of the regiments had four companies, each com-
pany contained two hundred fifty men. Each regiment

also had a headquarters company, supply company, and machine gun company.[19]

The organizational changes occurred because of the advances in weapons technology and because of tactical necessity. Depth was necessary in both offensive and defensive formations. In the offense, regiments attacked in waves. Two battalions abreast frequently led an attack followed by a supporting wave of the third battalion. A regiment or brigade constituted a reserve from elements in the first two waves. The reserve followed the attacking waves until needed. The defense required successive positions in depth. For these formations to be adequate, regiments had to be large.

The machine gun was highest on the list of technical developments which changed organization. Finding the best organization to employ the machine gun took the whole war. In May, 1917, the A.E.F. commander authorized one machine gun company per regiment, by July, 1917, this authorization rose to one machine gun company per battalion. Ultimately, the A.E.F. authorized machine gun battalions for each brigade and division. This allowed brigade and division commanders to attach machine gun units as needed. This policy may be seen as the harbinger of a flexible unit combat structure that flowered in the armored combat commands

of World War II and the infantry divisional reorganizations since the Korean War.

Two other weapons that had an effect on unit organization and tactics were the Stokes mortar and the anti-tank cannon. Regimental commanders ultimately placed those weapons in a weapons platoon of the headquarters company of every infantry regiment.[20]

Each division also had a field artillery brigade of three regiments and a trench mortar battery. Two of the three field artillery regiments in a division field artillery brigade had two battalions of 3" or 75mm howitzers organized with three firing batteries, a headquarters company, a supply company and veterinarial field support. The third field artillery regiment in the field artillery brigade had 6" or 155mm howitzers. This organization had three battalions of two batteries each. The Army called larger caliber battalions motorized. They used an awkward tractor to pull their heavy weapons.[21]

Artillery regiments were also part of the corps artillery and the army artillery. The only difference was the larger number of motorized units, and predominance of larger calibers. Each 6" gun brigade had ammunition train sections composed of four truck companies, two truck companies per regiment. The 6" gun brigade also had a heavy ordnance repair shop. But

the basic patterns of organization for all regiments
were identical.

The improved artillery, barbed wire, and ela-
borate field fortifications that existed before the
arrival of the Americans hampered the operations of
cavalry regiments. As a result only four regiments
of cavalry served with the American Expeditionary
Forces. The cavalry regiments that did serve overseas
were the 2d, 3d, 6th, and 15th. All four regiments
served in remount duty.[22] Though the A.E.F. commander
authorized additional cavalry regiments for the war,
the additional cavalry regiments reorganized as field
artillery regiments before they deployed from the
United States. The four regiments that did see ser-
vice in Europe participated in reconnaissance, patrol,
and courier duties in addition to the remount service.

Armor was in use by the British and French
since its introduction by the British in September,
1916. On December 22, 1917, the Allied Expeditionary
Force commander authorized the A.E.F. Tank Corps. By
February 18, 1918, the Army organized a National Army
Tank Service in the United States. By the fall of
1918, American tank units using British and French
equipment were in combat. American manufacturers
were unable to complete any American tanks in time

for combat use. American organizations were com-
posed of battalions formed in tank corps. American
Army commanders did not organize tank regiments
during World War I.

The American force gathered for the war
reached a peak strength of 3,685,458 men by the end
of 1918. These men came from the Regular Army, the
National Guard, and the National Army.[23] The iden-
tity of the three different groups was completely
lost as the Army absorbed men from all three groups
in units together. By June of 1918 Congress changed
the designation of all land forces to "United States
Army."

The Army replacement system intended for
World War I was one of unit rotation. The plan was
to bring divisions forward intact after their person-
nel attended training to prepare them for action. The
replacement division would relieve the division on
line and the combat worn division would move to the
rear for rest, recuperation, and replacement of men
and equipment. It just would not work. Of forty divi-
sions sent to Europe the first year of American
participation, the A.E.F. placed thirty on line. They
then broke up ten divisions for replacements to main-
tain the strength of committed divisions.

Obviously, the replacement actions of the American Expeditionary Forces resulted in the break up and redesignation of many regiments. The Army only organized sixty-five regular infantry regiments during the entire war. However, the Army organized a total of 297 infantry regiments of all types during the war. When replacement of men in units on line became essential, army commanders could afford little or no regard for personnel integrity or regimental continuity.

An excellent example of the problem was the Massachusetts regiments, descendants of the North, East, and Boston regiments referred to in Chapter 2. The old 2d Infantry remained intact under redesignation as the 104th Infantry. The 101st, 102d and 103d, as well as the 101st Engineer Train, 101st Supply Train, Military Police and parts of the 3d, 4th, and 5th Pioneer Infantry absorbed the other Massachusetts regiments.[24]

It is appropriate to mention that the effects of automatic weapons, gas, and improved artillery had further effects on organization. The dispersion necessary for survival resulted in development of the battalions in such a manner as to increase their independence. In addition, military policy discouraged units

from specific geographical localities to prevent dis-
proportionate losses of personnel as the British and
certain American regiments experienced during the war.[25]

The square division was a ponderous organiza-
tion suited to the static war for which General
Pershing had created it. With the armistice that
ended the war came the end of the era of static mass
warfare. The proliferation of improved weaponry and
mechanization caused strategists and commanders to
consider replacements for the square division and
its cumbersome subordinate organizations.[26]

Sweeping change has to begin at the top. On
June 4, 1920, Congress passed a new National Defense
Act. The new Act governed the organization and regu-
lation of the Army until 1950. In effect, the Act
acknowledged the need for maintenance of the civilian
components and made that a task of the Regular Army.
The Act ended the policies of an expansible Army that
could not successfully mobilize when peacetime author-
izations restricted forces to the size of regiments.
It also authorized a maximum officer strength more
than triple that of the actual pre-war authorization.
And, promotion of officers, except for doctors and
chaplains, were henceforth made from a centralized
list controlled at Army level.[27]

During the decade immediately following World War I, the experiences of the war dominated the Army. With the knowledge that memories of the war would fade the Army organized infantry, tank and artillery boards to guide and plan developments of organizations and their equipment.[28]

The earliest contribution came from the Infantry Board which revise the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&Es) of infantry regiments. The revision amounted to a reduction in size which stemmed from the experiences in war which had repeated that the number of rifles in a regiment was impossible to control. The Infantry Board actions eliminated one rifle company from each battalion and reduced the number of platoons in the remaining companies from four to three. A machine gun company replaced the rifle company thereby placing the heavy machine guns under the control of infantry battalion commanders.[29]

In 1922 four regiments replaced the horses and mules of their field and regimental combat trains with the first army trucks. The trend toward motorization continued slowly with regimental headquarters receiving cars by 1936 and by 1939 nearly all regiments could boast of their mechanical mobility.[30]

Even with its lack of mechanical reliability, the tank was a proven combat weapon. The problem was

to properly employ it. The National Defense Act of 1920 abolished the Tank Corps and assigned the tanks to the infantry. By April of 1922 the Army assigned the tank companies to infantry divisions under infantry control. The result of that action was retardation of the development of armor until its release from infantry control in 1939.[31]

Seventeen cavalry regiments were still on the roles after the passage of the National Defense Act. Because only a few cavalry regiments saw action in World War I, tradition and a lack of foresight convinced a few diehards that the trenches of World War I were the exception rather than the rule. The Army used a few light mechanized vehicles in the 1920's. However, it was not until the early 1930's that mechanized cavalry regiments appeared mounted in modifications of the infantry's light tanks. The Administration authorized two cavalry divisions but only one was active. The cavalry division had two brigades of two regiments each. During the period of the late 1920's the cavalry arm lost three regiments and ninety-eight troops, some of which had been in continuous existence since the authorization of the 1st Dragoons. By February, 1928, the number of troops in the cavalry regiments declined from six to

four and the cavalry eliminated all separate machine gun squadrons and troops.[32]

The tradition attached to a number of old cavalry units was nearly lost because of the many organizational changes which threatened multiple inactivations. However, the Army established a policy of retaining surplus units on Army roles in an inactive status permitting the retention of units for future use. This begins the policy of inactive units which became more common place after World War II. With such a policy regimental traditions were not lost and an effective support of esprit de corps would remain for later mobilization.

The total strength of the Army, the number of active cavalry regiments, and the need to maintain fighting strength in troops governed the strength and composition of cavalry units from 1928 to 1939. During that period cavalry regiments had an approximate average of 690 men. There were seventy-eight men in the headquarters troop; twenty-eight men in the band, four rifle troops with 119 men each, and a machine gun troop with 108 men.[33]

The Army first organized mechanized cavalry regiments on paper in 1932. The first regiment was similar to a horse regiment with an authorized strength of forty-two officers and 610 enlisted men. The

regiment had a covering squadron, a combat car squadron, a machine gun troop and a headquarters troop. Just like the horse regiment, the combat car squadron had four troops.

In early 1933 the cavalry selected Fort Knox, Kentucky, as the site for test and development of mechanized regiments. In the same year, the 1st Cavalry moved to Knox from Texas, and the process of replacing the horses with combat cars began immediately.

Legislation did not restrict reductions to cavalry, the war had indeed grown to a faded memory and throughout the Army austerity was manifest in troop reduction. The Army compensated for the reduction in manpower with the development and exploitation of firepower. Of sixty-five infantry regiments authorized in 1920 the Army inactivated twenty-six by 1922. By 1938 only thirty-eight infantry regiments remained and fourteen of those thirty-eight had only two active battalions each. All but two regiments had headquarters detachments instead of companies.[34]

The divisions which the .my planned to use to form the first line of defense existed only on paper by the decade of the 1930's. The Army General Staff gave mobilization assignments to both active and inactive regiments that, on paper, organized divisions. The situation of paper divisions remained until 1939.[35]

Many field artillery regiments had retained the French 75mm howitzers and 155mm howitzers of World War I. What the field artillery regiments did not retain were the organizations of the war. Three battalion artillery regiments were the first to disappear from active service. The light field artillery regiment of 1935 consisted of two battalions of three batteries each, a regimental headquarters battery, a service battery, a band, and a medical detachment. The artillery regiment's commander of 1935 claimed a tactical role which consisted of the responsibility to assign zones, missions, and position areas. However, the official policy credited tactical organization above battalion to division artillery, corps artillery and general headquarters reserve artillery. All batteries of field artillery, until 1941, had six sections, four gun sections, one caisson section and a maintenance section.[36]

The austerity of the great depression remained until 1935 when a policy of increased government spending resulted in a slight increase in personnel. Because of the increases in personnel and money, on November 5, 1935, the chief of staff approved a letter which began a series of experiments to reorganize Army organizations.[37]

The objects of the experiments were to develop an infantry division that was smaller, faster and with greater firepower than the square organizations. In addition, by 1935, regimental organization was in such confusion that there were five different types in the United States, while no two overseas regiments were alike. The disparity in regiments made planning and resupply difficult. Coupled with the need for re-organization at division and regiment level was a desire to reorganize the battalion to a complete combat unit which would contain all the elements needed to perform offensive and defensive missions. The battalion was no longer to be dependent on the regiment for attachment of additional firepower, except under unusual circumstances.[38]

Testing began in 1937 with the 2d Infantry Division as test vehicle. By 1939 the Infantry Board developed a full new set of TO&Es from squad to division. The new triangular organization was put into effect on September 15, 1939.[39]

In the maneuvers of 1940 five divisions field tested the triangular organizations. The results were so satisfactory that the Army triangularized nine divisions before the year was out.

The triangular division was almost one-half the size of the square division. The offensive striking

force of the new division was its three infantry regiments, three 105mm howitzer battalions, and one 155mm howitzer battalion. In support of these units were an engineer, medical, and quartermaster battalion, a reconnaissance troop, a signal company and a military police company.[40]

The triangular organization eliminated the brigades, this placed the infantry regiment in the role of a tactical and administrative unit. Infantry regiments of 1940 had two or three battalions, a cannon company, an anti-tank company and a headquarters and service company. Regiments subdivided the regimental headquarters company into two main parts. The company had a communication platoon and an intelligence and reconnaissance platoon. These platoons provided the augmentation necessary to perform the new tactical role.

The Army completely and permanently eliminated the field artillery regimental headquarters with the reorganization to triangular divisions. The artillery redesignated the field artillery battalions in such a manner that only the lowest numbered battalion retained the original regimental designation. The reorganization substantially increased the support assets of the field artillery battalions to allow them to function independently. This change was taken completely in stride

facilitated by the fact that artillery regiments had
seldom deployed intact. Field artillerymen considered
the reorganization as improvement in field artillery
since battalions were now more independent and it was
much easier to mass their fires. The traditional
regiment had been an obstacle to the massing of its
battalion's fire with that of other battalions.[41]

National Guard units did not reorganize until
after their entry on federal service after December,
1941.[42] However, the triangular structure was
basically the organization that all divisions used
in World War II.

The reorganization of existing units was
nearing completion in March, 1942, when the first
change occurred. The new armor division organization
eliminated the brigades. The combat of World War II
was highly mobile requiring flexible combined arms
commands tailored to achieve specific objectives. The
Armor Board added two combat command headquarters, that
became popularly known as combat commands "A" and "B"
to each armor division. These new organizations pro-
vided flexibility demanded by armor missions because
the division commander could compose any combination of
divisional units for as long as he saw fit.[43]

The infantry divisions actually applied the
same corrections except they did not create new

organizations. In the infantry divisions the regi-
mental combat teams (RCTs) became the infantry
equivalent of the combat command. An RCT was a
grouping of combat units around an infantry regi-
ment in order to accomplish a specific mission. A
typical RCT contained a regiment of infantry, a bat-
talion of artillery, a company of combat engineers,
a company of tanks, a medical collecting company and
a signal detachment. Because of their flexibility
the combat teams were valuable organizations.

In 1943 the armor divisions reorganized again.
The combat commands eliminated armor regiments com-
pletely and armor divisions added a third combat com-
mand, the reserve command. Developers of the armor
division primarily designed the reserve command to
provide a headquarters for reserve elements and to
provide control on the march rather than in combat.[44]

It is important to note that to facilitate
the use of combat commands and RCTs the battalions
also required internal organizational change. Regi-
ments had to this point provided administrative sup-
port for all regimental organizations freeing their
battalions of those burdens. By December of 1943
battalions had headquarters companies in place of
headquarters detachments and were administratively
self-sufficient.[45]

During 1943 regimental organizations disap-
peared from the organization of service troops. Army
commanders reorganized their truck regiments into
self-sufficient separate battalions. Medical regi-
ments, formerly organic to armies, were also broken
up into collecting, clearing, and depot companies and
attached to subordinate elements where needed. From
that point on the basic unit of organization for sup-
ply and services became the company. For command and
control of several companies division commanders
created battalion headquarters and headquarters de-
tachments for divisional units. For several battalions,
as found among non-divisional organizations, army com-
manders created group headquarters. The only noteworthy
exceptions were chemical, military police and signal
battalions which remained under the control of their
parent regiments.[46]

For World War II, the Army organized 317 regi-
ments of various kinds of infantry. There were types
of infantry that had never appeared among Army organi-
zations before the war. There were three mountain
infantry regiments, twelve glider infantry regiments,
and sixteen parachute infantry regiments.[47]

The designation of regiments followed the tra-
ditional pattern throughout the war. The Army reserved

numbers above five hundred for parachute infantry
regiments. Glider regiments came from any of the
numbers below five hundred, a result of an effort to
perpetuate earlier regimental histories. The three
most unusual regiments, occasionally called hybrids,
were the 473rd, 474th, and 475th Infantry Regiments.
The Army organized the 473rd Infantry from a consoli-
dation of the veterans of four anti-aircraft bat-
talions. The 474th Infantry contained men from the
1st Special Service Force, the 1st, 3d, and 4th
Ranger battalions, and Norwegian-Americans from the
99th Infantry Battalion (separate). The 475th Infan-
try Regiment formed from the veterans of the 5307th
Composite Unit (Provisional), more commonly called
"Merrill's Marauders."[48]

The Army broke up or eliminated all but six
regiments of armor and organized separate battalions
from them. Cavalry mechanized completely. Some ef-
forts to retain the horses appeared in the form of
horse-mechanized regiments. In those regiments cavalry-
men used large vans to transport horses at the pace of
mechanized elements. The National Guard regiments pro-
vided seven horse-mechanized regiments.

With the activation of the 9th and 10th armored
divisions in 1942 the Army redesignated the 2d, 3d,
11th, and 14th cavalry as armored regiments. Shortly

thereafter, the general staff revised the directives
to inactivate the cavalry regiments and reactivate them
as armored regiments. In 1943 the Army reactivated
the cavalry regiments. On April 4, 1946, the Army
abolished horse cavalry in the United States Army. In
1951 the Army consolidated the descendants of the four
cavalry and the four armored regiments and reorganized
them to form four armored cavalry regiments active
today.

On June 1, 1945, the Infantry Board published
new TO&Es for infantry organizations. The infantry
regiment had grown from 3,256 to 3,697 men. Most of
the increase occurred in the increase in rifle com-
pany strength from 193 to 242 men. The Board also
added new weapons when they placed rocket launchers
and recoilless rifles in weapons platoons. But, in
the 1945 regiments the new TO&Es eliminated the cannon
companies. The cannon companies born at the end of
World War I ultimately became mounted 90 mm guns, in
effect a tank, and as a result were a duplication of
armor attachments. The organization of June, 1945,
was the last modification of the war.[49]

On June 17, 1945, the Army established the
general boards to prepare a factual analysis of the

strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the
United States forces in the European theater. The
general boards recommended additional changes for in-
fantry regiments. The board members felt that the
regiment's headquarters was still too weak for a tac-
tical role. They recommended additional communica-
tors, military police, elimination of the anti-tank
company, more personnel in service companies and most
important assignment of the regiments S-4 to a bat-
talion and that each battalion have its own S-4, sup-
ply, and service capability. The board also criticized
the reinforcement battalions. Army TO&Es authorized
reinforcement battalions or replacement cadres assigned
to regiments with the intention that they would train
and indoctrinate replacements for the regiments and
that divisions or regiments would rotate to rear areas
for recuperation and replacement. This never occurred
and the reinforcement system did not operate to allow
time to build up esprit or to contribute to close per-
sonal teamwork considered necessary for success in
combat. The board members recommended that replacement
battalions be organic to divisions.[50] Two wars had
proven the futility of attempting to operate regimental
replacement battalions.

With the end of World War II came the unfor-
tunate experience of demobilization by point system.

The system pleased the public but, its effects on unit integrity, efficiency, and combat capability were catastrophic.[51] The Army completed the process of demobilization in June, 1947.

From the recommendations of the General Boards all the branches changed TO&Es in April and October of 1948, and again in April and June, 1949. Armor organizations had already eliminated regiments so they were the least effected. The Armor Board designed armor changes primarily to strengthen battalions.[52] Infantry divisions incorporated many of the recommendations of the general boards.[53] Artillery organizations added thirteen officers, five warrant officers, and over one hundred fifty enlisted men to each battalion. The primary changes in artillery organization were an increase to six section batteries and an increase in battalion staff and service capabilities to heighten administrative self-sufficiency.[54]

The infantry regiments of 1950 grew from 3,697 men to 3,774. infantry regiments consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, three battalions (each had their own headquarters companies and heavy weapons companies), a 4.2 inch mortar company (with twelve mortars), a heavy tank company (replaced the old anti-tank company), a medical company, and a service company.[55]

In the Army Organization Act of 1950, Congress designated "Armor" as the branch of armor and cavalry. With the activation in 1950 of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment the total number of active regiments of this type was five. The five armored cavalry regiments were the 2d, 3d, 6th, 11th, and 14th; none of them served in the Far East during the Korean War.[56]

The infantry regiments of the mid-1950's total forty-six regiments and thirteen separate battalions. Of forty-six infantry regiments, the Army organized eleven as separate organizations. In addition, National Guard regiments brought twelve infantry regiments into the active Army for the Korean War.[57]

The Army eliminated the Negro units which had become a part of the Army during the Civil War in the mid-1950's. As of June 30, 1954, no separate Negro units existed on the rolls of army organizations.[58]

By 1956 only fifty-four infantry regiments and four armored cavalry regiments remained on active duty. The period following the Korean War to 1956 had been a particularly difficult time as the administration in a re-evaluation of national policy began the era of "massive retaliation."

On February 1, 1955, Headquarters Continental Army Command (CONARC) began studies of a new concept

tailored to the national policies of massive retalia-
tion. The Army Chief of Staff approved the concepts
initially titled "Pentana Army" in June, 1956. The
two most prominent characteristics of the Pentomic
concept are found in its approved name--pentagonal
structure and atomic capability. An organization
based on five subordinate units replaced the three
unit organization of the triangular system. Tactical
nuclear weapons became the key weapons system in this
new pentomic organization.[59]

By 1958 all army divisions had reorganized.
Gone was any semblance of the three regiment structure
and regimental commands. Instead there were five bat-
tle groups of a size between battalion and regiment.
The requirement for wide dispersion on nuclear battle-
fields to deny the enemy nuclear targets was a key
consideration in adopting an organization with five
small combat units, while developments in the field of
communications made a broader span of control possible.
The Pentomic reorganization eliminated the regimental
service companies and medical detachments along with
the regimental headquarters. The concept transferred
their functions to headquarters and headquarters com-
panies (troops) of the battalions (squadrons).[60]

The Pentomic organization was a divisional
reorganization and as such is not within the scope of

this paper, but like the square and triangular organizations of the past, its effects induced major changes in all units. The single most important change was the permanent elimination of the regiment from the infantry structure. Only armored cavalry regiments would return to that structure in the reorganization of 1963.

The armore Aivisions combat command organization was easily adaptable to the nuclear battlefield. Because of that, the Reorganization Objective Current Armor Division (ROCAD) and subsequent reorganizations for armor represented little more than the gain of an atomic capability.[61]

The Army's commanders and General Staff viewed the Pentomic reorganization as a beginning rather than the end of the Army's adaption to the nuclear environment. Because the potential for limited non-nuclear war was growing, Pentomic organizations were no more than interim measures. By May, 1964, all divisions reorganized again under a newer concept called Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD).[62]

ROAD, like Pentomic, was primarily a division reorganization. The important point is that under ROAD only the armored cavalry regiments returned to the regimental structure. It is important to note

that the armored cavalry regiment of 1963 was in rea-
lity a completely new organization. The total size
remained about the same but the addition of aviation
and its effects on tactics made it a modern regimental
combined arms combat team.

Pentomic reorganization brought with it the
most drastic reorganization of Army units since tri-
angularization, or for that matter since the abandon-
ment of Anthony Wayne's Legion in 1796. The Pentomic
concept eliminated both regiments and battalions in
the infantry arm. Pentomic reorganization raised the
question of how to designate the new units. The Army
staff solved the problems with the adoption of the
Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS). CARS was a plan
developed by the Army staff on the model of the
British regimental system.[63]

The Secretary of the Army approved the CARS
system on January 24, 1957. The concept is based on
the fact that efficiency and morale of fighting men
are greatly heightened by pride in their unit. Unit
pride often springs from past achievements, traditions,
battle records, and battle honors. Since the most
significant combat unit in the American Army has been
the regiment, the CARS system uses the regiment as its
base. In addition, because it is not used as a

tactical organization, it is no longer subject to periodic reorganization. One of the problems incurred in the system was that in truth there are not many historically significant regiments. Under the CARS system, regimental honors and traditions are shared. With CARS, the regiment is not a tactical unit, but a family of units. Each member unit traces its lineage to an element of an historically significant regiment.[64]

Under CARS units may claim two kinds of honors, earned and shared. All the elements of a parent regiment may share the campaign credits and honors of the parent regiment. Units under a parent regiment may also claim their own contributions to the regiments honors by display of special devices on the streamers of their colors.[65]

With the Army's reorganization under the ROAD concept the designations of battalions became standardized. The official designation for all battalions consisted of the battalion number and the parent regiment. Descriptive terms such as airborne, mechanized, or separate, are placed in parentheses after the numerical designation.[66]

The CARS system maintains regiments on permanent active roles with only the headquarters of the

regiments inactive. At the present time there are
sixty-one CARS infantry regiments, fifty-eight field
artillery, twenty-two air defense artillery, twenty-
nine armor/cavalry and one special forces regiment.[67]

Under the original plans for CARS, the Army
would adopt the system in five phases. The first
three were designations in order of the Active Army,
the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. The
fourth phase involved planning for mobilization of
additional elements. The fifth phase was to provide
a home for the regimental headquarters, a home for
all members of the regiment. The original plan en-
visioned the Army assigning the regimental headquarters
to a permanent location where the regiment could dis-
play and maintain regimental records, colors, and
trophies. The Army Chief of Staff rejected a pro-
posal to implement this last phase in 1960 because of
a lack of funds.[68] To this date the Army has imple-
mented neither of the last two phases. However, with-
out exception, the CARS system has accomplished the
first three phases thereby demonstrating its flexibility.
Most important, the CARS system has perpetuated the
honors and the histories of the regiments.

REGIMENTAL REVIVALISTS AND THE SOCIOLOGISTS

A review of the general history of the regi-
ment was essential to describe the organization, and
to relate the facts behind previous periods of reor-
ganization. The regiments have, in fact, withstood
numerous reorganizations and quite possibly had
another internal reorganization occurred before the
acceptance of pentomic organizations, regiments may
have survived both Pentomic and ROAD.

The suggestion that the regimental system
could have survived is based upon acceptance of the
thesis of Colonel Carleton E. Fisher.[1] In December,
1955, with the Army on the threshold of a radical
series of reorganizations, Colonel Fisher suggested
that the advantages of the regiment need not be lost
in creating atomic age infantry units. His theory
was that if the Army called the brigades or combat com-
mands regiments and reorganized them to perform as the
brigades and combat commands perform, the organization
would be just as effective.

Colonel Fisher made a few critical assumptions
which changed the nature of the regiment of the early

1950's. First, he recognized the validity of field
tests and combat experience and agreed that a regiment
should be a headquarters and any number of battalions.
Combat experience and field tests had shown that the
old regimental system of logistical, administrative,
and combat support from regimental companies was in-
flexible. Because of temporary assignments with wide
dispersion caused by the RCTs and combat commands,
there was insufficient support assets to meet require-
ments. Colonel Fisher also agreed that it was neces-
sary to concentrate a portion of the service support
in the division support command and to eliminate
regimental tank companies in favor of separate tank
battalions. In simple terms, Colonel Fisher sug-
gested that the brigade as we know it today, as solely
a tactical command, could be called a regiment. The
only difference would be the controversy of whether
the battalions should be organic to the regiment, or
separate organizations attached as needed.

Colonel Fisher used a brief review of regi-
mental history as evidence that the only barriers to
his suggestion were a psychological disadvantage and
the rigidity of tradition. The psychological disad-
vantage in 1955, according to Colonel Fisher, was that
the retention of the name regiment would in effect

mean the argument for retention of the rigid system.
It might also encourage periodic outcries for a re-
turn to regimental control of administrative and
logistical support companies. In other words, it
we retain the regiment there would be nothing
psychologically new about the organization. The
rigidity of regimental tradition was probably the
major reason for departure to a new organization.
To retain the regiment many leaders felt that the
main question was whether or not the battalions were
organic to the regiment. If the battalions were to
remain organic to a regiment many thought that flex-
ibility would be lost.

When the transition to Pentomic organization
occurred in 1956, there were a number of writers who
began to argue with Colonel Fisher's thesis by of-
fering a new series of suggestions. Most popular was
that the British regimental system might be the
answer to the problem of developing flexibility of
organization without losing unit continuity and the
traditions associated with the regiments.

Actually the suggestion to adopt a portion of
the British regimental system preceded the Pentomic
organization by more than a year. Lieutenant Colonel
Spencer P. Edwards, Jr. described a number of sug-
gestions in an article which appeared in May, 1955.[2]

Colonel Edwards reminded his readers that the regi-
ment should not be a tactical unit. He did say
that it should be a repository of tradition and a
headquarters for an indefinite number of battalions.
Battalions that are members of a regiment should be
administratively, logistically, and combat support
self-sufficient to permit their deployment to any
division.

Almost all the writers of the period within
a year of the Pentomic reorganization had similar
suggestions to adopt the British system. There were
a few who suggested the retention of the pre-Pentomic
regiment. Among them was General (then Colonel)
Bruce Palmer, Jr.[3]

In May, 1955, General Palmer recommended a
streamlined infantry regiment without alteration of the
basic structure. One problem with General Palmer's
suggestion was that he relied heavily on deployment of
Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs). From his vantage point
in 1955, the RCT, rather than the division was the best
basic unit of combined arms. General Palmer's ideas
also included making the infantry battalion logistically
self-sufficient. His ideas were primarily influenced
by European experience where the RCTs received their
battle test. They had proven themselves in warfare
where position defense was impractical because of wide

frontages. Another problem with General Palmer's suggestion was that adoption of RCTs would not solve all the problems of reorganization in the mid-1950's. Reorganization had to include a standard combat command system. One of the goals of both Pentomic and ROAD reorganization was to design a standard division organization. The RCT did not appeal to armor enthusiasts nor to mechanized or armored infantry proponents.

During the test and evaluation period a few articles appeared that questioned the existence of esprit de corps in the regiments of the 1950's. Major General H. W. Blakeley condemned rotation and the Army's replacement system for making some of the Army's regiments merely numbers on a roster.[4]

General Blakeley recommended changes in both the replacement system and the adoption of portions of the British regimental system. Many different replacement systems received testing and evaluation between 1950 and 1960. The Army experimented with gyroscope or unit rotation, with and without dependents. The Army also tried variations of individual rotation plans. In most cases the individual plans worked best in conjunction with a division or higher replacement unit. Many individuals did not care for permanent assignment to a regiment especially those

who felt they could be promoted faster if they could
be moved to higher rank positions regardless of the
organization. Since corps and division headquarters
were now permanent peacetime organizations, it was
easier to compete for positions of higher rank or
responsibility, which were common in higher head-
quarters, with individual rotation plans. As a re-
sult the Army drifted into an individual system to
facilitate possibilities for promotions. Gyroscope
rotation was also a failure in practice since equip-
ment and facilities could not rotate with the person-
nel. Mismatched assignments and turbulence from fre-
quent movement caused wide-spread dissatisfaction.

Because so many writers advocated the British
system, it would be advantageous to review that system.
The British regimental system is basically the same
as described in Chapter 1 except for one major change
which occurred in the nineteenth century under the
command of Lord Viscount Cardwell. Cardwell designed
a system to facilitate the simple objective of sup-
porting peacetime troop rotation between the home
islands and the colonies. At the time the British
Army adopted Cardwell's plan, it met with vigorous
opposition. However, in less than ninety years the
system has grown so strong that the whole British na-
tion would unite instantly for its defense.

Cardwell's plan was only a modification of a
system with origins reaching back over the ages to
the days of medieval knight service and feudal levy.
Before the 16th century all land tenure in Britain
depended on the tenant's liability for military service.
When called by the king to take up arms the local land-
owner reported for duty with a band of tenant-followers
from his lands. The band of men, all sharing similar
predilections and prejudices, knew each other and
firmly believed that together they formed the best
combat team in the king's army.

With the birth of the British standing army in
the 17th century, the method of recruiting that had
been so successful in the past remained. The king be-
stowed a Royal Warrant to form a new regiment upon an
individual of local prestige and position. The holder
of the Royal Warrant, the colonel, went to his own
territorial region to fill his regiment's ranks. Even
though the officers purchased their commissions from
the colonel, the officers were friends, or the sons of
friends, who had reputations within the region recruited.

Initially British regiments adopted their colo-
nel's name. In 1757 British regiments received numbers
and adopted the name of their home county, where the
regiment remained during peacetime. The fact that the

regiments or their battalions often received transfers from one brigade to another in no way affected their individual esprit de corps. Their fealty even today is primarily to their own regimental traditions enforced by the support of the local civilian population.

With Cardwell's modification all infantry regiments had two battalion groups. At least one battalion of selected regiments served in the colonies. Each regiment consists of at least one Regular Army battalion and one or more Territorial Army (National Guard) battalion.

Cavalry regiments, except for the Household Cavalry, were all members of "cavalry of the line," all soldiers enlisted for cavalry joined the cavalry of the line and not a specific regiment. In the first year of the Second World War the British Army merged the cavalry of the line, with the Royal Tank Corps, and formed the Royal Armoured Corps.

Today the Royal Armoured Corps is comprised of regiments that use traditional names. The officers and men of the Armoured Corps receive assignments to home regiments on a more or less permanent basis. Initial armor training is centralized and assignments across regimental lines are common.

Within the British infantry, regiments are
now grouped in divisions, such as the Scottish Divi-
sion, the King's Division, or the Queen's Division.
Soldiers enlisted into the divisions receive training
and serve with whatever regiment requires them. Every
effort is still made to allow officers and enlisted
men to stay as long as they desire with their parent
regiment.[5]

With the outbreak of war, the Army would ex-
pand by mobilizing the Territorial Army and then re-
cruiting a number of new wartime battalions. Bat-
talions serving outside the home territory or in com-
bat with a wartime brigade do not necessarily have to
rotate intact. Recruits train in the Depot and Head-
quarters which for the infantry is permanently located
in the home county. When a requirement for replacements
occurs, they are sent from the depot or from another
battalion of the same regiment.

In the British system the regimental headquarters,
commanded by a lieutenant colonel, permanently remains
in its home county. The headquarters is responsible for
such things as recruiting, induction and demobilization,
individual and regimental records, veterans welfare, and
regimental customs and procedures. The senior retired
officer of the regiment is given the honorary title and
position of Colonel of the Regiment, with responsibilities

of watching over the interests of the regiment. The
Colonel of the Regiment selects candidates for com-
missions, represents his regiment on official and
non-official occasions, and prescribes policies on
domestic matters.

This system obviously has advantages in that
it promises unit integrity, conesiveness, and a sys-
tem to maintain history, tradition and esprit de
corps. Nonetheless, this system has disadvar ges.
First, the system would represent a radical change
in American Army administration practices. Men can-
not be classified simply according to branch of service,
grade and specialty. Every assignment and record would
have to include the regiment so that troop assignments
could be made within regimental units. In the American
Army, combat troop duty represents about one-half the
possible assignments so another system would be neces-
sary to administer assignments outside those positions.
This is not as great a problem in the British Army as
it would be in the American Army because of the dif-
ference in relative size of the countries.

Britain's total population in 1974 was approxi-
mately 56,250,000. Britain's total armed forces were
361,500 (including 9,300 enlisted outside Britain).
Of the total British armed force, only 177,000 men
serve in approximately 69 regiments and 55 separate

battalions of all types. In the same year, the
American Armed Forces numbered 2,252,000 out of a
total population of 210,900,900. Of the total
American Armed Forces the Army had 801,501 person-
nel (including 16,000 women). Overseas, the Army
deployed more than 300,000 men and women in 1974.[6]

The second greatest disadvantage to American
adoption of the system is the increase in the risk of
one area suffering heavy losses in wartime. This dis-
advantage is not denied by the British, they have
taken the position that it is a risk of war and must
be accepted and that the risk can be minimized by
keeping the units small. According to Major Julian
Paget, "It is no more or danger nowadays than the
possibility of whole cities being wiped out by an
atomic attack." However well the British can ac-
cept this disadvantage is one thing, we do know the
Americans cannot because of American reaction to
losses of large numbers from one family and one com-
munity which occurred during both world wars. The
American Armed Forces have for the past thirty years
enforced policies which discouraged units from re-
cruiting solely from specific geographic localities
and prohibited multiple members of a family from being
assigned to one command unless it is at their request
and then the right of sole-survivorship must first be
waivered.

The third disadvantage lies with the character of the American people who are unlike the British who spend their entire lives close to the same spot where they were born. Americans are prone to move frequently and far away from home. Like the frontiersman of America's early history, modern Americans are far more apt to move if only because they can experience a change even if opportunity is not promised. In short, to live out an army career in the same unit for twenty to thirty years violates the wanderlust of the American psyche.

A fourth disadvantage of the British regimental system is that it has prevented the trial of new ideas. The British have not fully examined centralized selection of men, use of training centers, and the matching of men to jobs based upon intelligence, skills, and aptitudes.[8]

There are many other disadvantages, in fact, the best document including discussions of the major disadvantages is Infantry Bulletin No. 38, published by the British Directorate of Infantry in 1946.[9] It is interesting to note that in reorganization of the British infantry, the British system relied on the decisions regarding the "teeth to tail ratio"[10] for the survival of their system. We find the American

Army in the same position today, greatly concerned
with the ratio of combat to support elements.

The majority of American advocates who
wished to see the regiment retained also wanted to
see the adoption of portions of the British system.
Such men as Major General Hamilton H. Howze,
Brigadier General Edwin K. Randle, Colonel Elmer
Schmierer, Colonel Lyman H. Ripley, Colonel Patrick
D. Mulcahy, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel H. Hays, Major
F. W. Wunderlich, Major James W. Kerr, Captain
Thomas G. McCuniff and Captain Harold J. Meyer all
wrote artilces for professional periodicals advocating
adoption of the British regimental system.[11]

A direct result of the arguments by proponents
for the British system was CARS, the Combat Arms Regi-
mental System. Secretary of the Army Wilbur Bruckner
approved CARS on January 24, 1957, after it had re-
ceived more than two years of study.

CARS has admirably proven itself as an effec-
tive solution to the Army's problem of maintaining
historical continuity among combat units. The American
Army borrowed the plan directly from the British sys-
tem, however, the American Army planned also to incor-
porate the concept of the parent regiment as the head
of a family of battalions. In addition, the Army

General Staff planned to permanently assign the regi-
mental headquarters to CONUS locations where they
would provide facilities to maintain regimental
histories, records, perform recruiting, and operate
regimental training units. The General Staff planned
to assign the responsibility for supervising the
activities of the Regular Army regimental headquarters
to the Continental Army Command. While the National
Guard Bureau would monitor the National Guard regi-
ments.

The regimental headquarters have not received
support for a number of reasons. In short, it is an
expensive proposition. Because the Army separately
designated the Regular Army, the Reserve, and the
National Guard units, the concept of a "home regi-
ment" seems unworkable. In the British system all
the battalions, Regular, Territorial, and Conscript
Army are organic to the home regiment. The CARS pro-
posal in effect created two separate groups of regi-
ments. In a review of American history, we can find
evidence that some regiments never had a home. Be-
cause they never had homes it would be necessary to
select homes for them, another aspect judged neither
feasible nor desirable.[12]

Early studies recommended that regimental
headquarters be established outside the tactical

structure of the Army.[13] The headquarters of all
regiments could be assigned to their respective
branch and schools centers. The Department of the
Army staff concurred in the findings of the study
but the Chief of Staff could not implement the plan
because school commandants were reluctant to support
the activities proposed for the regimental head-
quarters. In October, 1971, the Chief of Staff
directed a re-examination of the feasibility of im-
plementing the assignment of parent regimental
headquarters to permanent locations, but the study
reaffirmed the weaknesses of the "home regiment" con-
cept, and deferred final judgement until more favor-
able conditions appear.

The most current suggestions to re-evaluate
the regimental system came from Colonel William L.
Hauser who studied the contemporary Army and pub-
lished his findings in a book entitled, America's
Army in Crisis.[14] In addition, Captain Richard H.
Sinnreich and Colonel George K. Osborn, both faculty
members at the United States Military Academy have
devised a plan involving the revival of regiments.[15]

Colonel Hauser believes that young men joining
the Army should feel that they are becoming part of an
elite organization. He feels that the first step in
the process would be the revival of the regiments.

Colonel Hauser also believes that identification of
soldiers with regiments and their histories rather
than with a battalion that is only nominally con-
nected, would compensate for any losses in flexi-
bility for combat organizations. He believes that
the Army could profit from the esprit de corps
created with slightly different uniforms that could
be authorized to distinguish regiments. The Army
could be divided into a fighting army and a sup-
porting army and the regiments of the fighting army
could concentrate on training for war. Members of
the fighting army regiments could take additional
pride in their regiment because of its reputation as
a combat unit with rigorous standards of discipline.

Captain Sinnreich and Colonel Osborn have
provided the most recent plan to revive the regiment,
reorganize the Army, and improve the overseas rota-
tion system.

Their plan has three primary mission areas.
First, "reactivation of the permanent regiment as the
administrative parent of all combat battalions (infan-
try, armor and field artillery)." Reconstruction of
combat arms regiments as active parent organizations
with commanders, headquarters, and permanent homes,
exactly as the British system but located at multi-
regimental depots throughout the United States.

Second, they have recommended periodic rotation of regimental battalions through each of four mission areas--deployed, training, alert, and standdown in turn, to include overseas deployment.[16] This suggestion is designed to eliminate individual rotation and has merit even though it is not clear how officers will rotate through advanced schooling. There would also be difficulties with assignments outside of the regiments.

Third, the Army command structure would be reorganized to accommodate the first two proposals as well as the three major components of a deployed division, a regimental depot, and a contingency alert force. The proposals have merit, but they certainly are not without disadvantages. Captain Sinnreich and Colonel Osborn recognized that many problems existed as potential barriers to their proposal but the key issue is that no reorganization proposed or undertaken in the past can provide all the answers. Captain Sinnreich and Colonel Osborn represent two more writers who believe that we can and must get more from our organizations and that whatever plan is devised, the history and traditions of the regiments should be maintained.

The United States Marine Corps still maintains its regimental organizations. The Corps has

done this in their own fashion, facilitated by their
small size. The Marines impress every recruit with
the history and traditions of the Corps. Marine
Corps history has always been a mandatory requirement
in the training of recruits. The Marine Corps Guide
devotes a substantial portion of its pages to the
history of the Corps. Histories have been carefully
written to credit marines not regiments or divisions
with participation in battles at Tripoli, Buena
Vista, and the Halls of Montezuma. In addition,
they have maintained two or more recruit training
centers that provide training on a regional basis
rather than at regimental depots. After receiving
recruit training marines are assigned to divisions
that will further assign personnel where they are
needed. Marines may be assigned to any regiment, and
no effort is made to establish home regiments. During
combat, regiments may deploy intact but combat elements
are normally tailored into a marine amphibious unit
(MAU) which is built around a battalion landing team.
For larger operations the Corps employs a marine am-
phibious brigade (MAB) which is built around a regi-
mental landing team and an aviation group. These or-
ganizations fight with elements of several regiments
that accumulate their own honors and histories to
share with the parent regiment and the entire Corps.

A great deal can be learned from the suggestions of men who have studies the problems cf military organizations from not only the historical point of view, but also from the scientific studies of the sociologists. History, tradition, esprit de corps, honors and pride are important to military units but the social relationships of men in military units are just as important, if not more so.

The earliest internal studies of the Army by sociologists occurred during the Spanish-American War; however, meaningful contributions to army organization did not occur for another fifty years. During World War I a relatively new approach to the use of military personnel received stimulation from social research. Sociologists convinced Army commanders and personnel managers of the advantages and the importance of considering a person's intelligence, skills, and aptitudes in assigning him to a military occupation. For better or for worse during World War II the social research of the previous wars resulted in an elaborate mechanism for matching men's skills to the jobs required. We know now that no organization as large and dispersed as the Army can exist without a standardized personnel selection system.[17]

It was also during World War II that research
began into the area of "morale." An excellent sum-
mary of this research exists prepared under the
guidance of Samuel A. Stouffer and published under
the title The American Soldier. Stouffer's obser-
vation on "morale" versus organization is:[18]

> Thus we are forced to the conclusion
> that personal motives and relation-
> ships are not uniquely determinate
> for organization in combat... of-
> ficers and men must be motivated to
> make the organization work, but not
> all of them have to be motivated, nor
> must they all agree on details of
> social philosophy or be bound by ties
> of personal friendship in order for a
> functioning organization to exist.
> To put it another way, the best sin-
> gle predictor of combat behavior is
> the simple fact of institutionalized
> role: knowing that a man is a sol-
> dier rather than a civilian. The
> soldier role is a vehicle for getting
> a man into the position in which he
> had to fight or take the institutionally
> sanctioned consequences.

The point here is that in choosing a form of organiza-
tion for the Army when "morale" and organization con-
flict, the organization can still function well. This
assumes that the new organization is administratively
and tactically as sound as the old organization.
Morale was important to the great captains who placed
it above many material obstacles and even predicted
victory when their forces were in possession of high
morale.

An army in action is an example of what may
by called a dynamic crowd. Hugh Foster wrote:
"... a dynamic crowd ... [is] an assemblage of men
united for common action and inspired by the same
ideas and desires."[19] Foster did not write a great
deal about morale either but he believed that all
dynamic crowds possess an essential underlying
character which becomes its religion. The religion
of a dynamic crowd is best defined with a quotation
from an anonymous French psychologist, as "placing
all the resources of the spirit, all the submission
of the will, all the ardour of fanaticism, at the
service of a cause, which then becomes the guide and
end of all the ideas and actions of the assemblage."[20]
To have a religion one must have a soul, a dynamic
crowd would have a collective soul. A collective soul
is fragile and temporary compared to that of the
individuals who are part of the crowd, but, with sti-
mulation, the collective soul can rise to heights im-
possible for the individual soul to reach. Crowds
have been known to commit atrocities from which their
component individuals would have recoiled in horror.
At other times crowds have shown enthusiasm and
devotion, and performed incredible acts of heroism
and self-sacrifice which no individual within the
crowd could have accomplished alone.[21]

The best recorded acts of heroism of crowds are found in the volumes of military history when groups of soldiers have ignored danger and fought together to gain victory for their cause. Crowds have an overwhelming craving to be led. Leaders can influence crowds by assertion, repetition, and example. Foster says, "Crowds are impressed by coolness, courage, self-confidence, determination, and vigour in utterance and action, and even by personal appearance."[22] What has been said about crowds applies to military organizations. Foster adds, "A mass of soldiers differs from a mob mainly in the habits acquired by discipline, the facilities for action afforded by organization, and the ideal of character which their profession, and their very uniform, suggest to them to live up to . . . ."[23]

Within crowds or military organizations there are subelements which can be called primary groups. The primary group is the individuals immediate circle of associates with common bonds, such as a group of friends, family members, a squad, a section, or buddies. During World War II the crucial contribution of cohesive primary group relations to morale in times of stress impressed sociologists and led to the analysis of group cohesion of the German Wehrmacht.[24]

The analysis of the Wehrmacht by Edward Shils and

Morris Janowitz contained two hypotheses pertinent

to this thesis.[25]

> First, "it appears that a soldier's
> ability to resist is a function of
> the capacity of his immediate pri-
> mary group to avoid social disinte-
> gration."
>
> Second, "the capacity of the primary
> group to resist disintegration was
> dependent on the acceptance of
> political, ideological, and cultural
> symbols only to the extent that these
> secondary symbols became directly as-
> sociated with primary gratifications."

This was expounded in the simplest of terms by Briga-

dier General S. L. A. Marshall when he said, "I hold

it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the

thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep

going with his weapon is the near presence or the

presumed presence of a comrade."[26]

The resistance to primary group disintegration

that has been referred to may be no more than group

cohesiveness until a point is reached when the group

members recognize the proximity of danger. Social

cohesion is increased by the proximity of danger and

the importance of the group's mission. In theory,

as the threat of danger increases, and becomes ap-

parent to the group that the mission is important,

the social cohesion of the group will increase.

Janowitz claims that, "this is the great difference
between peacetime and wartime military establish-
ments; this is the difference between garrison life
and realistic training exercises."[27]

This is true for the great bulk of the men
in the Army. The peacetime modern volunteer Army
of today is for most men an eight to five job inter-
rupted by alerts, field duty, and details. There
are few urgent military missions in the modern vol-
unteer Army. The most important function of the
primary group on alert is to assist the individuals
of the group sustain the tensions of maintaining
operational readiness. Social cohesion under con-
ditions of extended stress depends almost entirely
on the performance of small unit leaders and the
availability of rest periods.[28] The ability of Bri-
tish soldiers to withstand longer periods of stress
in World War II and Korea was not due to the British
regimental system. Sociologists attribute the abi-
lity of the British soldier to withstand more than
twice the stress than American soldiers to the En-
glish policy of more frequent rest intervals than
prevailed in American units.[29]

The performance of small unit leaders is
another interesting subject. The United States

Marine Corps has made it a standard in the development
of the recruit that he be impressed with the idea that
he may one day be the leader. Even as a marine private
he must prepare himself to assume command. In the
Chosen Reservoir Battle in the Korean conflict, there
were units of the Seventh Marine Regiment that were so
drastically reduced by casualties that non-commissioned
officers became commanders and privates led platoons.[30]
From the first moment of induction the marine recruit
must accept two principal ideas, all marines are infan-
try men, and all marines are leaders. These are ob-
viously not always truths but they are excellent goals
and though they may also produce bravado, there is
evidence to suggest that the ideas take hold and as-
sist in the development of leadership.

The Marine Corps has no exclusive claim to the
development of small unit leaders by impressing men
with a possibility that they might assume command.
Some British leaders claimed that the fact that their
units could immediately replace leaders, was responsi-
ble for the survival of many men who were prisoners of
war. During World War II British POWs established
elaborate chains of command, insisted on adherence to
the Geneva Convention, and maintained someone in the
position of command even when efforts were made to

prevent that practice. Often every man in the camp
was informed of his position in the chain of command.

To complete a full circle of study it is also
important to examine the linkages of primary groups
with the larger military and social environment and
with the individual. For enlisted men, and some of-
ficers, during World War II the scopes of social
environment were limited to their own company or
their battalion. Whenever the men began to feel bat-
tle fatigue and a breakdown occurred in communications
to higher commands, a feeling developed that leaders
were acting unreasonably. Except for a few officers
who maintained contact with the higher headquarters
military authority was remote and beyond reach.[31]
Since the results of social research on soldiers in
Vietnam has begun to appear, a new conception of the
primary groups is emerging. Primary groups today are
more often two person systems, or buddies.[32] When
buddies form a primary group the perspectives of the
individual soldiers often go no farther than platoon
and company. The battalions of today's Army co
have the same relationship to the soldier today that
the regiment had for the soldier of World War II.[33]

Another important consideration of the indivi-
dual and the primary group is the matter of a replace-
ment system. Sociologists Robert K. Marton and Alice S.

Kitt believe that the problems associated with the ad-
justment of individual replacements may have been over-
stated. They claim that studies which followed men
through the replacement stream have all stopped short
of his actual integration into a combat unit. Merton
and Kitt claim, "Direct observations of this adjust-
ment process indicate that infantry squads can develop
informal mechanisms for receiving the replacement."[34]

Though we can learn valuable lessons from re-
views of historical precedent, the Army may not as-
sume a permanent configuration because of technologi-
cal, political and budgetary change, all of which
directly influence organization and tactics. Changing
technology creates new patterns of combat forcing
change in organizations. New organizations often
modify organizational behavior and authority in the
military establishment. The changes in the organi-
zation through innovation are not routine but dynamic.
Change has always occurred. First, there has been a
change in organizational authority, a shift from
authoritarian domination to greater reliance on mani-
pulation, persuasion, and group consensus. The ad-
dition of more field grade officers to regiments and
the permanence of the three battalion organizations
indicated further delegation of authority and decen-
tralization of command. Second, a narrowing skill

differential between military and civilian technicians
is occurring because of an increase in highly techni-
cal specialties in the military. Third, there is a
measurable shift in officer recruitment from a rela-
tively high social group to a broader base which are
more representative of the American population as a
whole.[35] Fourth, the officers, released from the
stagnation of the regiment, follow more prescribed
career patterns designed to lead to advancement.
Fifth, the growth of the Modern Volunteer Army, and
its development as a vast managerial enterprise with
increased political responsibility, has placed a
strain on tradition. Officers refuse to believe
that they are just military technicians who lead men
and fulfill missions. Enlisted men want to hear the
reasons why the mission must be performed.[36]

The future, with its space age technology,
promises an even greater measure of dispersion of
our organizations on the battlefield with a concurrent
growth in battlefield lethality.[37] Some bold predic-
tors have suggested that teams of men could one day
roam the battlefield with weaponry capable of massive
destruction beyond any conceivable contemporary
capability. Those concepts are radically more than
what confronts us today but even if we had to face

that situation now, the basic lessons of social re-
search will still have value. Sociologists have said
that the most vital characteristics of an organization
are: (1) Organizations must be tactically and admin-
istratively sound. (2) We must have capable small
unit leaders who can maintain social cohesion under
conditions of extended stress. (3) We must have an
urgent military mission or the capability of managing
tension within the primary groups. (4) It is impor-
tant to consider a person's intelligence, skills, and
aptitudes in assigning him or her to a military oc-
cupation. (5) Morale is important but only to the
extent that it is directly associated to primary gra-
tifications. Sound organizations can be effective
without high morale. (6) A soldier's resistance is
a function of the capacity of his immediate primary
groups cohesion.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The regiment was an organization which evolved
to provide administration, discipline, and instruction
for a number of tactical units. The regiment also
provided its subordinate tactical units with logisti-
cal support and personnel replacements. The origins
of the regiment are closely tied to the close of the
Feudal Epoch in 15th century Europe and the appear-
ance of firearms. The early organizations were
entirely commercial ventures undertaken by Swiss
and German mercenaries, however, they contributed
many of the characteristics of permanent professional
regiments found in later years. The colonel, the
regimental staff, the colors, the regimental depot
systems, and the regimental band were all found in
the commercial regiments which also developed the
tactics adopted by the early permanent regiments.

In the 16th century the French became the first
to organize permanent regional regiments but other na-
tions followed rapidly. Sweden's Army of regiments
under Gustavus Adolphus was so successful in the Thirty

Years' War that it became the model for organization
of all the armies of Europe.

The regiment in the 17th century was an admin-
istrative organization. Since the 15th century the
battalions of the regiments have been the infantry
fighting units. The experiences of the more success-
ful commanders resulted in the formation of a few
hundred men into battalions so that each regiment
could provide two or three battalions. Because regi-
ments sometimes only formed one battalion, there has
been confusion in the terms--battalion and regiment--
and even today they are often used indiscriminately.

The early regiments were flexible permanent
organizations. The regiments adapted to technological
developments which emerged during hundred of years of
warfare. The musket, arquebus, and improvements in
artillery necessitated modifications but the basic
system survived. The British studied the regimental
system and adopted it in the mid-17th century. Until
1881 British regiments had ten companies of infantry
or dragoons and six companies of cavalry. The British
regiments had only one battalion until 1881 and the
adoption of Lord Viscount Cardwell's reforms. After
1881 most British regiments had two battalions, one
which served in the home territory and a second which

provided a colonial garrison. During wartime the regiment's headquarters remained in its home region while its battalion(s) deployed with a brigade organized for war and commanded by a regimental commander temporarily elevated to brigadier by the king.

Though the British regimental system had faults, it was a proven system permanently established with the leading features of European organization and tactics. English success influenced the Americans to copy the features of the British system when they organized the Continental Army. It was a system that the Americans knew well since many of them had served in British regiments or in the colonial militia regiments in existence in the colonies since 1636.

Though the Americans began the Revolutionary War with the same regimental organization as the British, they modified the system almost immediately. By 1779 with Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben's guidance the regiments had one, two, or three battalions of two hundred men each to a regiment. Prior to von Steuben's actions to develop uniform standards of training, discipline, and organization Continental regiments were all different since each state had organized its regiments to their own state specifications. Engineer and artillery units served directly under Continental inspection and were not subject to state supervision.

Even though Congress authorized five regiments of artillery, both artillery and engineers deployed by company or smaller sized unit. In addition, as opposed to the British the Continental regiments received their support entirely from their home states. There were no depot systems for recruits or supplies.

After the signing of the peace treaty in 1783, barely seven hundred men remained in the Continental Army. On June 2, 1784, Congress discharged all but eighty men and a few company grade officers thereby completely severing the ties of lineage for all but one unit of the 5th Artillery. Congress reorganized the Army on the following day with an authorization of one regiment with eight infantry and two artillery companies which brought the entire army to a total of seven hundred men.

In 1792 Congress reorganized the Army into the Legion of the United States. The experiment with a legion remained until 1796 when the organization returned to a regimental structure consisting of four regiments and six troops of dragoons.

At the start of the War of 1812 less than seven thousand men filled an authorization of seven infantry regiments, one rifle regiment, one light artillery regiment and a regiment of dragoons. Though

Congress authorized an increase to more than forty-
eight regiments of infantry reorganizations by the
Congress in 1815 and 1821 reduced the Army to a force
of seven thousand men in seven infantry regiments, one
rifle regiment and four regiments of artillery. This
force was all that remained until the expansion neces-
sitated by the Mexican War.

Following the Mexican War Congress again re-
duced the Army to a peacetime level of eight infantry
regiments, four artillery regiments, two regiments of
dragoons and one regiment of rifles. The Army in-
creased only once before the Civil War adding two
regiments of infantry, two of cavalry and two of dra-
goons for a total authorization of eighteen thousand
men.

From the Mexican War until its dismissal as
an active army organization, there were times that
the regiment was not only an administrative organiza-
tion but it filled the role of a tactical unit. Es-
pecially in the Civil War many regiments were maneuvered
by their commanders as though they were battalions or
large companies.

The expansion of the Union Army for the Civil
War was a staggering task but by the war's end Congress
reduced the Army to forty-five infantry regiments, ten

cavalry regiments, and five regiments of artillery. The dragoons, reorganized into the Corps of Cavalry in the first year of the war, and cavalry regiments were now uniformly organized with twelve troops in three squadrons. Some infantry regiments had as many as three battalions, with eight companies each, but the reorganization of 1366 temporarily ended the three battalion regiments.

The changes in technology experienced in the Civil War led to more than thirty years of arguments to reorganize the infantry regiments. The European armies all had multiple battalions and even the British Army had changed. Because of ever widening battle fields and increasing dispersion the old regiment was too spread out for one commander to handle in combat. The officers frequently lost control even in companies and a system of internal organization of platoons, sections, and squads did not receive serious attention until after the war.

The major changes of the period following the Civil War included an increase in cavalry regiments at the expense of the infantry and finally on the eve of the Spanish-American War Congress authorized a reorganization of infantry regiments to three battalions each. After the Spanish-American War the Army found its position had drastically altered. Congress charged

the Army with the responsibility of providing men
for garrisons in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philip-
pines. In addition, the professionalism of the Army
and the capability of its organizations received
challenges from the administration and the press.

Life in a regiment to the beginning of the
20th century was a hard existence, often filled with
moments of terror, and months of boredom. Regiments
moved about the country so often that they rarely
formed as a unit. Most of the posts across the
country were too small for a regiment, some could only
hold a company. The rates of desertion, and court-
martial indicate that the often touted high morale of
the units was rare. The regiment was an excellent
organization for its time but by the turn of the
century its time was quickly passing. It is also im-
portant to remember that the regiment prior to the
Spanish-American War was no larger than one of the
battalions of the 1940's and 1950's.

The turn of the century saw Elihu Root appointed
as Secretary of War. Secretary Root led a series of
movements to reorganize the Army which culminated in
attempts to organize peacetime divisions, an Army War
College, mobilization planning and a permanent ef-
ficient general staff. Congress also required the

Army to provide overseas garrisons. Though overseas
garrisons were permanent, the personnel that filled
the ranks of the overseas regiments came principally
from stateside regiments who detached volunteers, or
ordered members to serve two year tours. Depots in
New York and California provided support for the over-
seas regiments eliminating the need for overseas units
to train raw recruits or to operate their own resupply
system.

Though the Army experimented frequently with
peacetime divisions the National Defense Act of 1916
provided the first peacetime authorization for divi-
sion organization. Though the Act had an effect on
the development of the division, the regiments re-
mained about the same within the three battalion struc-
ture until the organization of the World War I square
divisions.

The static trench warfare of World War I re-
quired a regimental organization with a strength nearly
double that of the pre-war regiments. The regiments
of the square division contained over thirty-seven
hundred men in three battalions made up of four com-
panies each. Each company had two hundred fifty men.
The regiment also had a headquarters company, a sup-
ply company, and a machine gun company. Technological

developments such as the machine gun, improved artillery, gas warfare, barbed wire, and elaborate field fortifications made the horse cavalry regiment obsolete for all but a few missions. Because of its vulnerabilities, horse cavalry began a decline which would not reverse itself until its abolishment.

The replacement system of World War I contributed its share of damage to regimental lineage. The critical need for replacements in committed units led to the break up and redesignation of many proud old regiments. In addition, men from the Regular Army, National Guard, and the National Army lost their separate group identities completely as the Army absorbed them into the same units.

Army strategists believed that the square division would find no place in future wars and efforts began immediately to find a division organization to replace it. The infantry regiments led the reorganization in the early 1920's with the elimination of a rifle company from each battalion and reductions to three platoons in each company. Machine gun companies replaced the eliminated rifle company bringing the machine guns under battalion control. In 1933 the cavalry began development of mechanized cavalry regiments. By 1935 experiments by Army developers were leading to the adoption of triangular divisions.

The period between the world wars could be
called the height of the regiments peacetime history.
Life in the regiments for the commissioned officers
was one of pomp, ceremony, and privilege. The Army,
victorious in the great war, received appropriations
for quarters, commissaries, theatres, post exchanges,
and many other facilities. Enlisted men addressed
the officers in the third person but clothing, equip-
ment, quarters, and subsistence had improved to the
point that comparisons with previous decades showed
great strides forward. The Army also rode out a
great depression with advantage over many civilians.
In addition, a remedy for the depression took the
shape of increased government spending to place money
into circulation. The Army received its share.

The beginning of World War II found the Army
in a traditional pre-war posture but the lessons on
mobilization learned from World War I did not go to
waste. The Army implemented the triangular organiza-
tion in all its regular divisions and the National
Guard followed suit immediately upon its activation.
Armor divisions eliminated the regiments in favor of
combat commands. The infantry divisions also applied
modifications except they formed regimental combat
teams for specific missions by grouping combat ele-
ments around infantry regiments. With triangularization

the Army permanently eliminated field artillery regiments and by 1943 the regimental organizations disappeared completely from the service troop organizations. Only the infantry regiment survived the reorganizations during the war. The infantry regiment had grown back up to almost thirty-seven hundred men. An increase in the strength of rifle companies was the most dominant factor but the regiments also added an anti-tank company, military police, additional supply and service personnel, communicators and a number of new weapons developed in the war.

The regiment grew again in the 50's but the adoption of the national policy of "Massive Retaliation" led to reorganization in 1956 to the Pentomic Army. The Pentomic reorganization meant the end of the infantry regiments. Only through the introduction of the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) was the Army able to retain the histories and the traditions of all its regiments. CARS proved itself as an effective flexible system when the Army reorganized in 1964 under Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD). Under ROAD only five armored cavalry regiments remained in the active Army organization.

Before the Army retired the regiment there were men who wrote in defense of the regimental system

and recommended its retention. It is important to
recognize that all of the men who recommended reten-
tion of the system and those who later recommended its
revival never advocated a return to the pre-World War
II system. The advocates of the regimental system
primarily urge the adoption of features of the British
regimental system. Most believed that the regiment
should not be a tactical unit, that battalions should
be independent organizations from the standpoint of
logistics and combat support to allow them to be at-
tached to combat commands or teams. The primary
motives for retaining the system were to retain the
histories and traditions of the regiments and use
them in development of esprit de corps and morale.
Writers added Army rotation policies to the list of
reasons to retain the regiment because of the regi-
ments potential for home regiment rotation plans.
However, Army experimentation with gyroscope and other
rotation plans defeated the arguments for home regi-
ment assignments because tests showed that type of
system as either impractical or disliked by American
soldiers.

The British regimental system prior to 1881
bears little resemblance to the British system of
today. Since 1881 the British organized regiments
with multiple battalions using Regular Army, Ter-
ritorial Army, and conscript personnel. Some

centralized training and assignments between regiments
are common. British infantry regiments are grouped in
divisions today and infantry soldiers receive assign-
ments to divisions and can serve in any regiment.
British regiments have still retained their histories
and traditions but during both world wars the British
system barely survived. There have been numerous at-
tempts by British leaders to change the system and
almost all have been stubbornly rejected. The British
have resisted change primarily because the wealth of
history and tradition have done a great deal to pro-
mote esprit and provide standards of behavior that
simplify the task of command. It should be noted that
it is not just the British regiment and its history
that are responsible for the high morale of British
regiments. British policies require more frequent
rest in combat, the relatively small size of the Army
helps, "hometown" duty assignment is an asset and
many other small things that have little to do with
the sort of organization provide the lion's share of
support for esprit de corps and morale.

Many features of the British regimental sys-
tem that encourage its longevity are not advantageous
for the American Army. Americans seem to enjoy the
opportunities of mobility within the Army. The
American Army since World War II has assigned men to

military occupational specialties according to their
intelligence, skills, and aptitudes. The British
are forced to take men from their assigned recruiting
area and make assignments wherever vacancies occur.

Sociologists are playing an ever increasing
role in the study of Army organizations and personnel.
Sociologists have claimed that an administratively and
tactically sound organization is more important than
personal motives and relationships, or simply the
organization is more important than morale. However,
if we can have both a sound organization and morale
the Army would enjoy a considerable advantage.

In the United States Marine Corps morale is
achieved in a unique way. Marines hang their history
on their Corps, little of it is lavished on individuals.
Even though the Corps has had its individual heroes,
it seems as though they have shared in glory which has
primarily been bestowed on the Corps.

Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) has done
an outstanding job of preserving the regiment as a
vehicle for Army history and traditions. The regiments
live in CARS and even though the headquarters is inac-
tive there is something to build on and now there is
a meaningful system of designating units.

Perhaps the key to increasing morale and achieve-
ment in today's organizations lies in developing small

unit leaders, men who can influence the mass of sol-
diers that can be termed dynamic crowds. Those men
must understand what impresses or motivates military
organizations. The small unit leader has taken the
place of the regimental commander as the crucial
individual in the management of stress and the devel-
opment of high individual morale. This is because
the primary groups, those groups most important to
the individual soldier, have dwindled to buddy
relationships. Outside of their primary groups,
under the danger of combat or the tension of main-
taining operational readiness in peacetime, the
soldier not only finds it difficult or impossible
to develop a close relationship but outside of one
or two superior groupings he may find that he no
longer trusts the organization.[1]

The principal functions of the primary group
are to resist in combat, to accomplish the urgent
military missions of combat, to provide a mechanism
to sustain stress in periods of peacetime and to
avoid social disintegration. Consequently, the role
of the small unit leader becomes the most critical
key to the question of the value of the regiment.
The individual soldier would benefit more from ec-
tempts to develop esprit and morale by development

of small unit leaders than by the revival of the regiment. Studies of the individual and the replacement system add additional support. Observations of infantry squads have shown that they can develop systems to receive new replacements, something the early American regiments found difficult.

From the preceding chapters we are reminded that several hundred years have elapsed since the invention of gunpowder until this substance forced a drastic change on organization. With the invention of nuclear weapons we have observed approximately the same degree of change in a ten year period that occurred in roughly the equivalent of what was done in five hundred years with gunpowder. The changes in organization that occurred from the triangular organizations to ROAD were urgently needed to maintain a viable defense and a capability for retaliation. General Hans von Seekt said, "In army organization, it is dangerous to mistake a momentary condition for a permanent one, and to overlook the fact that an army organization is a living organism which in form and spirit must keep step with the times."[2] Major General Charles V. Bromley said, "The Art of War constantly changes. To adopt a hard, fast, and unyielding belief in the efficiency of a given type organization,

a tried tactic, or an existing piece of equipment is dangerous."[3] Colonel Clifford Walton, of the British Army said, "Every trifle, every tag or ribbon that tradition may have associated with the former glories of a regiment should be retained, so long as its retention does not interfere with efficiency."[4]

We cannot return to the regimental system of the early 1950's because we have learned that battalions must be self-sufficient, logistically, and in combat support. In addition, we know that the communications of the regiment of the early 1950's was inadequate. And we have learned that the regiment did in fact lack flexibility. The rising costs of maintaining the Army shows that we cannot afford the luxury of an administrative headquarters, or the addition of another level of command. The possibility of tactical nuclear warfare does in fact require that organizations be made up of a mix of individuals from differing geographic origins to prevent disproportionate losses to specific areas. The change in weapons technology alone would have forced another organizational change had the basic system remained.

From the preceding comments it is obvious that as a system of organization, the regimental system is obsolete and little remains of it that the modern Army could make use of. There are some things that exist

from that system that are useful such as the history
and tradition. However, some traditions widened the
gulf between the Army and its soldiers. In the past
few decades hundreds of harmful "traditions" have
disappeared. In 1957 the Army officers and enlisted
men began to wear "Army Green." In the past it had
been tradition for the officers to wear a distin-
guishing uniform. However, it was recognized that
the practice began to breed hostility especially in
light of growing movements toward individual rights.
The practice of enlisted men addressing officers in
the third person was also a tradition which only
served to further insulate the officers from the
enlisted men.

There are many things that we may have believed
about the regiments that were not true. It was not al-
ways possible to choose the regiment that you wished to
serve with. Not everyone enjoyed a familial atmosphere
in their regiments. Unit rotation systems to some in-
dividuals meant stagnation, no chance for advancement,
or opportunity to change occupation. Regiments did not
have permanent homes. They may have had permanent
headquarters locations, or a post or base which they
called permanent or home because their families re-
sided there or because they returned there frequently.

Over the entire span of American history from 1775
to 1957 the regiments did not even enjoy consolida-
tion into regimental formation until 1930, except
in wartime.

The strongest recommendation that can be made
from this paper is to treat regimental history and
traditions as Army history and Army tradition. The
modern Army has begun to copy the techniques of the
Marine Corps rather successfully. Soldiers magazine
is a classic example. Soldiers, like Leatherneck or
The Marine Corps Gazette, is designed for a mass
audience of soldiers not addressing one element. Army
recruiters and personnel offices are also moving in
the same direction. Unit of choice options should
have been dropped long ago. They are being discon-
tinued now and advertising is using the Army at large
as an organization. Personnel offices operate on an
area basis with unit Personnel Services NCO's. This
is efficient and it fits the way the soldier thinks.
The soldier sees the Army as a green machine, when
he can identify with it and feels he is a part of it
and most importantly when he is familiar with the way
it works, its history, and its benefits, he begins to
find its benevolence. Only if it remains as another
stranger or as a hostile element will he refuse to as-
sociate with it.

Honorary organizations, symbolic headquarters, the use of volunteers and all the other proposals to squeeze a little more out of CARS are fruitless exercises in futility. Honorary regimental organizations exist all over the United States. Every issue of the Army Times contains notice of meetings, reunions, and information on current association officers. These notices are designed to appeal only to former members. Someday each notice for a regimental reunion will appear for the last time. The same thing could happen to any regimental association, because it is forced to compete for the soldiers attention with the Association of the Uni ed States Army, the Non-Commissioned Officers Association, the division association, post associations, and veterans associations.

Thus, the regiment should not be revived as an active Army organization. Additional study should be done in the fields of social research and cost effectiveness. A comparison should be made between the cost of a similar organization in the American Army. There is reason to suspect that even though pay is comparatively lower for the British soldiers, the cost of training and maintenance of the soldiers may be proportionately higher. In doing the suggested studies primary effort should be placed on the identification of specific factors of British or American systems that develop esprit de corps and morale.

Any actions toward development of the small
unit leader are positive steps in the right direction.
The Non-Commissioned Officers Education System (NCOES)
is an outstanding example of the type of NCO develop-
ment essential to the development of an administra-
tively, and tactically sound organization with esprit
and high morale.

Present Army histories are a barrier to an
effective implementation of the advanced phases of
CARS. As Mark M. Boatner discovered while researching
Military Customs and Traditions:[5]

> I am unable to provide several pages
> of interesting U. S. regimental tra-
> ditions. They are not available from
> official Army historical sources.
> There is no point in digging them out
> of old military history books. The
> only legitimate source is the regi-
> ments themselves--nothing can really
> be called a regimental tradition if
> it is not well known to the men
> serving in that regiment today.

Army historical efforts are improving but a great deal
remains to be done to include the soldiers in the
Army's histories. It is difficult to find excerpts
from history which relate the life of the enlisted
man on the frontier or in the battlefields of Korea.
Gaps exist in the history of the soldier throughout
our Army history even though tons of writing have been
done on our leaders.

Phase V of the CARS plans called for assign-
ment of parent regimental headquarters to permanent
locations and performance of support functions by
those headquarters. The type of support functions
envisioned were maintenance of regimental history,
traditions, and a set of records of members of the
regiment. In addition, the regimental headquarters
would conduct regimental recruiting, supervise re-
serve personnel, and operate regimental training
units. It would be needless repetition to examine
each of these points. It should be sufficient to
say that the phase is impractical and not in keeping
with the times. Finding outselves in "future shock"
as described by Mr. Alvin Toffler, we cannot afford
to encumber ourselves with administrative requirement
that we can avoid especially when their value is not
clear. All the regimental headquarters should be as-
signed enmass to their respective branch and school
centers. At the centers the colors and trophies can
be displayed in center museums. Most center museums
have a "Hall of Flags" which provide an excellent set-
ting for the regimental colors. The colors of the
infantry would be assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia,
the armor and cavalry to Fort Knox, Kentucky, the ar-
tillery to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the air defense artil-
lery to Fort Bliss, Texas, the signal units to Fort

Gordon, Georgia, and airborne and special forces
regimental colors can be housed in the museums at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

It is believed that the assignment of the
regimental headquarters to centers with their colors
is entirely appropriate. It is at the centers and
schools that the bulk of new officers and enlisted
men receive their basic training and their initiation
into Army organizations.

The regiments of the United States Army pro-
vided the nation with a rich heritage of proud tra-
ditions and stirring history. It is altogether
fitting that every scrap of evidence of that history
be retained within the capability provided by CARS.
It is entirely proper to treat the inactive regiments
as units that have been replaced by organizations
that are better prepared to fight on modern battle-
fields. Finally, modern Army organizations have
demonstrated an ability to cope with peacetime and
wartime stresses that can be expanded with the devel-
opment of small unit leaders.

END NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary
defines regiment as: 1. governmental rule; and
2. a military unit consisting of a variable
number of battalions or other units. Charles
James, Military Dictionary, 3d ed., London; T.
Egerton Military Library, 1810, pp. REG REG
provides the earliest definition available.
"A term applied to any body of troops, which
if cavalry, consists of one or more squadrons,
commanded by a colonel; and, if infantry, of
one or more battalions, each commanded in the
same manner. The squadrons in cavalry regi-
ments are divided, sometimes into six, and
sometimes into nine troops. The battalions
of British infantry are generally divided into
ten companies, two of which are called the
flanks; one on the right consisting of grena-
diers and another on the left formed of light
troops. There is not, however, any established
rule on this head; as both cavalry and infantry
regiments differ according to the exigencies of
service in time of war, or the principles of
economy in time of peace..." James continues
on but really does not pin it down.
William Duane, Military Dictionary, Philadelphia,
1810, pp. 532-83. Duane may have compiled one of
the earliest, if not the first, American edition
of a military dictionary. However, there is some
possibility that he may have borrowed from the
James dictionary since they differ only slightly.
Army Regulation 310-25, Dictionary of United
States Army Terms, Headquarters, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C., June, 1972, "regiment-
administrative and tactical unit, on a command
level below a division or brigade and above a bat-
talion, the entire organization of which is pre-
scribed by table of organization. The commanding
officer of a regiment is usually a colonel," p. 438.
The regiment has often been compared with the bri-
gade as an equivalent organization. Initially the

brigade evolved to provide the tactical organi-
zation that the regiment could not provide with-
out a great deal of modification. When the
brigade became a unit of the American Army it
was to provide a tactical formation of two or
three regiments. The formation of brigades was
only permitted in wartime and was to group units
of similar type or with a similar mission. This
action provided for a massing of a number of
regiments combat power. The combat power of a
regiment was tactically its battalions. The
regiments were at different levels of strength
from 400 to 1,000 men that were neither large
enough to fight independently nor standard
enough to be placed against opposing regimental
forces with any assurance of achieving parity
in strength. Brigading became one option which
remained.

2. AR310-25, Dictionary, "battalion – unit composed
   of a headquarters and two or more companies or
   batteries. It may be part of a regiment and be
   charged with only tactical functions, or it may
   be charged with both administrative and tactical
   functions," p. 82; "division – a major admini-
   strative and tactical unit/formation which com-
   bines in itself the necessary arms and services
   required for sustained combat, larger than a
   regiment/brigade and smaller than a corps," p. 188.

3. The statement that the regiment was an administra-
   tive unit can be supported in many ways, the ety-
   mology of the word is from the French Regie,
   Management, and the Latin regere, to govern. Today
   etymologists trace the word regimen from the French
   regime, which signifies system, regiment, admini-
   stration, and which again can be traced to the
   Latin regere. Consideration must also be given
   definitions within American Army Regulations. In
   the Army Regulations of 1889, Article XXXI, the
   regiment is composed of one or more battalions,
   each containing a designated number of companies.
   It is formed for purposes of administration, dis-
   cipline, and instruction. This definition can be
   found valid until December 15, 1924, AR235-5,
   REGIMENTS, para 1a, "The regiment is both an
   administrative and a tactical unit." Para. 1b,
   "In the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast
   Artillery, Engineers, and Chemical Warfare Ser-
   vice the regiment is an administrative unit."
   There was no other type of regiment in the Army
   at that time other than those listed in para. 1b.
   See Hubert Foster, Organization, London: Hugh Rees,
   Ltd., 1913, p. 172.

4. F. P. Roe, The Soldier & the Empire, London and
   Portsmouth: Aldershot, Gale & Polden, Ltd.,
   January 21, 1932, p. 48. R. Ernest Dupuy and
   Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military
   History from 3500 B C. to the Present, New York
   and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1970, pp. 100-136.
   Mark M. Boatner, III, Military Customs and Tra-
   ditions, New York: David McKay Company, Inc.,
   1956, pp. 5, 10. Foster, Organization, pp. 161-
   164. The British had employed individual mer-
   cenaries as early as 1066, when they were called
   "house carles" and "lithsmen." See C. Warren
   Hollister, The Military Organization of Norman
   England, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965,
   pp. 2-3.

5. Hollister, Norman England, p. 279.

6. A. V. B. Norman and Don Pottinger, A History of
   War and Weapons, 449-1660, New York: Thomas Y.
   Crowell Company, 1834, pp. 108-110.

7. Dupuy, Encyclopedia, p. 420. The French Army con-
   sisted of fifteen "compagnies d'ordonnance," of
   about six hundred men each. "Compagnies d'ordon-
   nance," are companies of armed men. This is the
   period of the beginning of experiment in the
   reorganization of armies. Tactics are tested
   for the use of gunfire. The massive formations
   of men in phalanx and square begin to disappear.

8. Commercial basis - A profit making operation with
   investors somewhat like a small stock company.
   The Italians called the companies "Condottieri."

9. Dupuy, Encyclopedia, pp. 400-430. Dupuy presents
   one argument on p. 427 with the date of 1486 as
   creation of the Landsknechtes in Germany, other
   historians agree more positively with 1444. Lynn
   Montross, War Through the Ages, New York: Harper
   Bros., 1962, pp. 204-205. Theodore Ropp, War in
   the Modern World, New York: Collier Books, 1959,
   pp. 19-25. Foster, Organization, pp. 167-170.

10. The German Reiter (or Ritter) were the first
    "modern" cavalry. They were organized like the
    Landsknechtes and at about the same time.

11. When a man committed a crime which disgraced his
    regiment, the complaint was brought to the en-
    signs, who thrust their colors point downward
    into the ground, vowing that they would not be
    carried by the regiment again until expiation of

the dishonor. The result of this action was that
the men of the companies investigated each case
themselves, without the intervention of officers.
If the men found the culprit guilty and he re-
ceived appropriate punishment for his actions,
the ensigns could again carry the colors. The
colonel waved the colors over the head of a man
who had paid for his crime and, after this ac-
tion, the men of the regiment considered the
infamy removed.

12. Maniples: A subdivision of the Roman legion con-
sisting of either one hundred twenty or sixty men.

13. Cohort: One of ten divisions of an ancient Roman
legion.

14. T. J. Edwards, Standards, Guidons and Colours of
the Commonwealth Forces, Aldershot, England:
Gale & Polden, Ltd., 1953, pp. 1-6. Historians
have argued that this may be the origin of the
regimental commander's insignia, the eagles of
the colonel.

15. Montross, History, p. 212. Julian Paget, The
British Regimental System, The Army Combat
Forces Journal, June, 1954, 4(No. 11), 30-32.

16. Dupuy, Encyclopedia, p. 458. John Fortescue, The
Empire and The Army, London: Cassell & Co., 1928,
p. 12, Footnote 1. A "cabo de colunela" (head of
the column) commanded the Colunela, a title which
has been said to be the origin of the word colonel.

17. Montross, History, p. 212. Congress authorized
five regiments of artillery by the end of the war.
However, the fifth was primarily an armorer and
artificer regiment.

18. Dupuy, Encyclopedia, p. 459. J. H. Stocqueler,
The Military Encyclopedia, London: Wm. H. Allen
& Co., 1953, p. 230.

19. Theodore Ayrault Dodge, Gustavus Adolphus, Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1896, pp. 22-62, and pp. 569-
581. Dupuy, Encyclopedia, pp. 529-530.

20. From the fifteenth century onwards the battalion
was always the fighting unit of infantry. In
the early sixteenth century when in some countries
the commercial company was only a large admini-
strative unit, the battaglia were its tactical

subdivisions, and formed small units fighting
separately. Hence, for a short period of time,
battaglione, "the great battaglia," was the
name given to a large fighting unit and often
consisted of a mass of men comprising several
regiments. The experience of the more success-
ful leaders pointed eventually to forming a
battalion of a few hundred men, so that two or
three could be furnished by a regiment. instead
of forming a huge battalion of several regi-
ments. The fact that sometimes the regiment
formed only one battalion accounts for the con-
stant confusion between the two terms, and
their indiscriminate use even today.

21. Each battalion consisted of four companies of
one hundred fifty men, seventy-five musketeers
and fifty-nine pikemen with officers and non-
commissioned officers holding the remaining
sixteen positions. In Gustavus' Army the men
referred to the battalion by the Italian name
battaglia.

22. Montross, History, pp. 268-273. See Foster,
Organization, pp. 176-180. Both Gustavus
Adolphus and Maurice of Nassau formed their
armies for battle in what they referred to as
Swiss fashion. The formation was with three
lines called van, battle, and rear. Each of
the lines constituted a brigade, a new and
infinite unit composed of several regiments
totalling any number of men. This was the
first introduction of the term brigade which
was derived from the Italian briga, French
brigue (a quarrel), and meant "a band of op-
posing combatants."

23. Dodge, Gustavus Adolphus, pp. 35-36. Some dif-
fering opinions were Montross, History, p. 269,
Dupuy, Encyclopedia, p. 529, C. R. L. Fletcher,
Gustavus Adolphus and the Struggle of Protestan-
tism for Existence, New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1892, p. 125.

24. Dupuy, Encyclopedia, p. 539. Foster, Organization,
p. 202.

25. Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970,
New York: Wm. Morrow & Co., 1970, p. 69.

26. In the French Army from 1684 to 1850, the French
confined the term of regiment to the cavalry and
artillery. The infantry used the term half-brigade.
James, Dictionary, p. REG REG.

27. Barnett, _British Army_, p. 71.

28. Barnett, _British Army_, pp. 84-88. Cromwell's cav-
    alry, called "Ironsides," provided a decisive edge
    at the Battle of Marston Moor, July, 1644. Cromwell
    attacked Rupert's Royalist Forces late in the day.
    Rupert believed that the day's fighting had ended
    and called for his supper. Cromwell's forces
    fought for an hour until Rupert and his men with-
    drew on the run. After Cromwell recognized the
    victory on his flank he rallied his men and at-
    tacked the opposite flank which was under the pro-
    tection of Royalist Cavalry commanded by Lord
    George Goring. Cromwell's forces scattered
    Goring's cavalry and deprived of the protection
    of cavalry the Royalist forces were rapidly mowed
    down. With the defeat of the Royalists at Marston
    Moor the Royalists lost an entire Army and the
    north of England.

29. Barnett, _British Army_, pp. 86-89. Foster,
    Organization, pp. 203-206. Parliament authorized
    the "New Model Army" a total of 22,000 men.

30. Barnett, _British Army_, pp. 90-99. Fortescue,
    British History, pp. 16-24. Fortescue gives the
    best description of the regiments composition,
    the horse regiment had six hundred men in six
    companies, the model army had one regiment of
    dragoon which had one thousand men in ten com-
    panies, infantry regiments had twelve hundred men
    in ten companies.

31. Barnett, _British Army_, pp. 102-104, 109.

32. Britain found herself needing protection for
    colonists from Indians, for the internal defense
    of her people, and for troops to back her trea-
    ties and alliances. In 1685, Monmouth's rebel-
    lion occurred and because of it the addition of
    nineteen regiments to the British Army. Of these
    new units six were dragoons, two hussars, nine
    foot and two regiments returned from foreign ser-
    vice. Barnett, _British Army_, pp. 113-116. In
    these passages Barnett has given us two things,
    first, an explanation of how the British regiments
    trace their lineages, and second, a comparison of
    the same problem we have in the Combat Arms Regi-
    mental System (CARS). See K. R. Lamison & John W.
    Wike, Combat Arms Regimental System, _Army Informa-
    tion Digest_, September, 1964, 19 (No. 9), pp. 16-39
    and _Outlines of History of Regiments United States
    Army_, Statistics Branch, General Staff, War Depart-
    ment, Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1921.

33. Fortescue, British History, p. 31. Except for the
changes brought about by invention, the British
Army was to remain about the same for the next two
hundred years. Actually it was not an Army because
three national establishments composed the British
system. They were the establishments of England,
Scotland and Ireland. In 1707, England and Scotland
united, and, by 1801, all three had united. In ad-
dition, the regiments were the largest peacetime
organizations, surprising in consideration of the
fact that since the British regiment was not a
tactical unit the British battalions became the
largest peacetime tactical units.

34. The practice of naming the regiments after their
commander remained until 1757. After 1757 all
regiments received numbers. In addition, the
regiments also adopted the name of the home county
or region. The French used the province for the
regiments name.

35. Walter Millis, Arms and Men, New York: New American
Library, 1956, p. 15. Fortescue, British History
pp. 31-33, 36. Barnett, British Army, p. 136. It
is interesting to note that until the end of the
eighteenth century it was a duty of the Army to man
the fleet.

36. Millis, Arms & Men, p. 15. Barnett, British Army,
p. 142.

37. Ropp, History, p. 30. Barnett, British Army, pp. 134,
178.

38. Millis, Arms & Men, pp. 12-13.

39. Millis, Arms & Men, p. 13.

CHAPTER 2

1. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States
Army, New York: Macmillan Co., 1967, p. xi.
Weigley's philosophy is that in a historical
study, in order to trace the regiment in the United
States Army, it is essential to examine two armies,
a regular army of professional soldiers, and a
citizen army of reserves of militiamen.

2. It was common practice to include men with military
experience in every colonial company.

3. Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the
   Seventeenth Century, London: Macmillan Co., 1904,
   p. 525. Massachusetts Colony Record Vol. I, p.
   186. In December, 1636, an act was passed which
   organized the trained bands into regiments.

   First Reg. - Suffolk Reg./1 mounted co. & 15 foot cos.

   Sec. Reg. - Middlesex Reg./1 mounted co. & 15 foot cos.

   Third Reg. - Essex Reg./1 mounted co. & 13 foot cos.

   In 1643, the Sergeant Major became regiment commander.
   Sergeant Major reported to the Sergeant-Major-General.
   The principal staff officer was the Surveyor-General
   of Arms, custodian of the colony's supply of ordnance,
   arms, and ammunition. There are two units today, the
   182d Infantry Regiment and the 101st Engineer Bat-
   talion, that trace their lineage to the North and
   East Boston regiments both of which are descendants
   of the Suffolk Regiment.

4. Weigley, History, p. 7.

5. Weigley, History, p. 3.

6. Weigley, History, pp. 16-19.

7. Weigley, History, p. 28. Initially the British regi-
   ments were shattered; but, eventually they developed
   tactics successful enough to defeat the French and
   to make a decent showing against the Indians. Hubert
   Foster, Organization, London, England: Hugh Rees,
   Ltd., 1913, pp. 137, 212-213. The British considered
   the organization of the American Army to be along
   completely original lines. British and American
   regimental commanders both had their own companies
   within their regiments until 1893 when the British
   regimental commanders relinquished control of their
   own companies and generally remained with the regi-
   mental headquarters. By 1889, British regimental
   commanders no longer deployed to combat zones with
   their regiments, instead they deployed their bat-
   talions under command of majors and remained with
   the Headquarters and Depot to supervise the recruiting,
   training, and administration. Some British regimental
   commanders did go to the combat zone, but not as
   regimental commanders. Some regimental commanders
   who displayed exceptional ability were made brigade
   commanders during the period of hostilities. Within
   a combat zone the British chain of command after
   1893 went from company to battalion to brigade and

then to division. The Americans maintained a
company, command for the regimental commander only
until the reorganization of 1794. The American
Army regimental commander commanded the regiment
through battalion commanders who were majors.
When American regiments had only one battalion the
command was often split with the colonel in com-
mand of a portion of the regiment and a lieutenant
colonel or major commanding another portion to
accomplish more than one mission. American wartime
organizations also retained the regiment within the
chain of command as another level between battalion
and brigade.

8. R. Ernest & Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of
Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present, New
York & Evanston: Harper & Row, 1970, p. 709.

9. Dupuy, Encyclopedia, p. 709. Differs with July 3,
1775. Weigley, History, p. 29. Says accepted date
is June 14, 1775.

10. It is admitted that 38 regiments may not be precise;
however, sometime in 1775, I believe that was cor-
rect. United States Department of the Army Lineage
Series, Infantry, (Part I), Washington D.C.: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1972, pp. 4-5. "By
December, 1775, there were forty-nine infantry
battalions (or regiments for the two terms were
virtually synonymous) and several unattached com-
panies in the establishment... The legislators set
the size of the army around Boston at 20,372 of-
ficers and men, to be organized into twenty-seven
regiments and some separate companies. In this
scheme New England, which had supplied forty-two
in 1775, provided twenty-six Continental regiments
in 1776. These twenty-six were numbered from the
2d through the 27th. They were designated Con-
tinental infantry in an attempt to transfer the
men's loyalty from the states to the Congress."
Weigley, History, p. 62. "The Continental Army
of 1775 comprised thirty-eight regiments of
greatly varying size... The key tactical unit was
the battalion, which was usually the same body of
men as a regiment, "regiment" being another term
denoting an administrative unit, while "battalion"
was the tactical term."

11. There is an exception, regiments of artillery
retained their Continental numbers. Artillery
required the type of technical training and ex-
perience that required its maintenance in peace-
time. It also required equipment that was dif-
ficult for a state militia organization to main-
tain.

12. Weigley, _History_, pp. 31-35.

13. Files were formations of two men, one in the front
     rank and one in the rear rank. The two men learned
     to fight together and were the origin of the squads
     or more correctly the fire teams of today. A bat-
     talion of infantry would total three hundred twenty
     men, which is a good reason for many arguments that
     the regiments were no more than battalions and the
     terms should be used synonymously. Do not accept
     that argument too willingly; to accept that point
     makes too many other organizational mysteries
     unfathomable. A battalion of artillery was some-
     thing else again. From 1775 and Col. Richard
     Gridley's artillery regiment there were ten to
     thirty-two companies in a regiment. Each regi-
     ment should have had four battalions and each
     battalion had two to ten companies. Most often
     battalions were of three companies of artillery
     and one company of artificers. The term corps
     was frequently used because I feel it just meant
     body or organization for lack of the knowledge of
     a correct organization. Legislators were not
     always versed in Army terminology, they still are
     not. Battalions and corps were occasionally used
     synonymously, as were regiment and battalion.
     See William E. Birkhimer, _Historical Sketch of
     the Artillery U. S. Army_, Washington, D.C.: James
     J. Chapman, 1884, pp. 1-3. Foster, _Organization_,
     pp. 19-22.

14. Congress set the size of the tactical battalions
     at one hundred sixty files in 1776. This size
     was for battalions of infantry or as incorrectly
     referred to occasionally, regiments. Regiments
     of artillery were measured by the number of com-
     panies from eight to twelve, this number varied,
     the number of mattrosses also varied, changing
     the aggregate. In the reorganization of 1776,
     Congress prescribed the Army as eighty-eight in-
     fantry regiments of 728 officers and men each.
     The infantry regiments organized into eight com-
     panies, each company consisting of four officers,
     eight non-commissioned officers, two "drums and
     fifes," and seventy-six privates.

15. The administrative unit was the regimental base
     (the headquarters and staff) and the battalion(s).
     Weigley, _History_, p. 62.

16. Weigley, _History_, p. 64. Regulations for the
     Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United
     States, Philadelphia, Pa.: War Department. Styner
     and Cest, 1779.

17. Birkhimer, Artillery, pp. 6-7. There were, in fact, five regiments of artillery authorized; however, the 5th was a regiment (battalion) of artificers. This authority came from George Washington on December 12, 1776, after he had received from Congress power to "order and direct all things relative to the department and operations of war." The 5th Regiment, being an artificer battalion was made subordinate to the "Department of the Commissary-General of Military Stores." In 1780, Congress reorganized the artillery to ten companies per regiment with a total authorized strength of 2,646 men.

18. The Congressmen argued that a standing force posed danger. To establish a standing Army would be to accept a European import that had been de- signed in the first place to buttress monarchy. Even if American circumstances minimized likeli- hood of despotism, creation of the instrument some Congressmen believed was the first step to a more centralized and more powerful government than was wise. The memory of the betrayal of the British monarchy by Cromwell in 1650 was not forgotten.

19. Mark M. Boatner, Military Customs and Traditions, New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1956, pp. 70-74. Birkhimer, Artillery, p. 23.

20. In 1791 this unit was formally designated the 1st Infantry. The First American Regiment from 1784 to 1 January, 1792 had for its commander Josiah Harmar of Pennsylvania. From 1784 to 1787 Harmar's regiment contained eight companies of infantry and two of artillery. This unit was redesignated 3d Infantry in 1815.

21. Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dic- tionary of the United States Army. (Vol. 2), Urbana, Illinois. University of Illinois Press, 1965, p. 560. See also Birkhimer, Artillery, p. 25. The twelve infantry companies of the regi- ment were arranged in three battalions.

22. On the North American Continent from December, 1636 to March 3, 1855, "horse" troopers were called dragoons. The traditional light dragoon soldier was trained and equipped to fight mounted or dis- mounted, to perform screening and reconnaissance, and to act as a scout or messenger. When the American Revolution ended in 1783, Congress or- dered the discharge of the remaining fragments of the ontinental Dragoons. They had never surpassed

four regiments of approximate size for the entire effort. During the next fifty years mounted organizations existed in the Regular Army only for brief periods. A squadron of dragoons added in 1792 disbanded before completion of the organization. In 1796, the Army returned to a regimental-type organization and the mounted portion was organized to two companies. In 1800, the two old companies dismounted and two years later they disbanded.

23. In 1870, Major General William T. Sherman stated that, "the reason why the Army abandoned the legions is that it was a fine tactical unit but the modern regiment was better adopted to administration." Walter Millis, American Military Thought, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966, p. 163.

24. Maurice Matloff, (Ed.), American Military History, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969, pp. 112-113. Heitman, Historical Register, p. 561.

25. In 1799, because of the threat of war with France, the authorizations went way up. However, only the 1st and the 4th Regiments got to the required strength. A total of 3,400 men enlisted for the 5th through 16th Regiments, but none for the others. By 1800, the crisis ended and a new administration that feared a standing Army rapidly reversed the buildup and cut the infantry back to two regiments.

26. Heitman, Historical Register, p. 570. A paper army, the actual strength on January 29, 1810, was 6,488.

27. William Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United States Army, Ashton, Maryland: Eric Lundberg, 1964, pp. 116-117.

28. Heitman, Historical Register, pp. 572-573. The Engineer Corps included twenty-two engineer officers and one hundred thirteen enlisted men. For the first time two hundred fifty cadets with direct authorization to the academy appears.

29. In the first six months of the war there were three different-sized regular infantry regiments. The 1st and 2d Regiments had ten companies, each with seventy-six privates. The 3d through the 7th Regiments had two more officers each and seventy-eight

privates in each company. The 8th through 11th had eighteen companies arranged in two battalions per regiment.

30. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, pp. 14-15; United States Department of the Army Lineage Series, Armor-Cavalry, Part I, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969, pp. 4-8; Outlines of History of Regiments United States Army, Statistics Branch General Staff, War Department, May 1, 1921.

31. Ganoe, History, p. 159. Heitman, Historical Register, pp. 578-579. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, pp. 14-15. Weigley, History, pp. 139-140. There were eight military districts but not enough of the Army remained or had ever been completely filled and organized to fill out eight regiments so only seven were immediately filled. Birkhimer, Artillery, pp. 44-45 says there were nine military departments, five in the north, four in the south. See Canoe, History, pp. 162-163 for best description of artillery posting.

32. Birkhimer, Artillery, p. 46. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 16.

33. General Regulations for the Army or Military Institutes, 1821, Philadelphia, Pa.: M. Carey & Sons, 1821, Article 44.

34. The Army had been able to maintain peace on the frontier by demonstrating the presence of its forces rather than by fighting. With the reduction in strength the Army's forces spent most of their time in garrison constructing barracks and farming. They were not able to maintain patrols and the Indians could rapidly judge the weakness. See Francis P. Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet, Lincoln Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 1953.

35. Heitman, Historical Register, pp. 685-687. Army Lineage Series, Armor-Cavalry, p. 9. Walter Millis, Arms and Men, New York: New American Library, 1956 p. 87.

36. Millis, Arms and Men, pp. 48-50.

37. Weigley, History, p. 163. Ganoe, History, p. 191.

38. Ganoe, History, pp. 193-195. Read these pages for the best description of the soldiers' life from 1842-1846.

39. The following force which represents approximately
one-half of the entire Regular Army was the force
which fought the bulk of the Mexican War and was
the initial force accompanying Taylor

General Staff			24
The 2d Regiment of Dragoons			596
The 1st	"	" Artillery	236
The 2d	"	" "	233
The 3d	"	" "	219
The 4th	"	" "	235
The 3d	"	" Infantry	533
The 4th	"	"	511
The 5th	"	" "	575
The 7th	"	" "	442
The 8th	"	" "	447
		Aggregate	4,049

40. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 21. Vernon
Pizer, The United States Army, New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1967, pp. 13-14. The title "Volunteer"
is applied to units or individuals who volunteer
only for the duration of a given war.

41. Heitman, Historical Register, pp. 590-595. There
were five acts of reorganization for the Regular
Army, two in May-June, 1847, two in February-March,
1947, and one on August 14, 1848.

42. Ganoe, History, pp. 228-229.

43. Weigley, History, p. 189. Fayette Robinson, An
Account of the Organization of the Army of the
United States, Philadelphia, Pa.: E. H. Butler &
Co., 1848, pp. 28-29. Robinson wrote that each
regiment should consist of two battalions, each
battalion of two grand divisions, and each grand
division of two companies. This was his opinion,
but it generally reflected the thinking of the
times that the regiment should have two or more
battalions and that companies should also have a
refined infrastructure of platoons, sections, half-
sections (squads), and two files (four men fire teams).

44. Regulations for the Norther "Volunteer" Army were
revised on May 1, 1861 and published for the bene-
fit of all northern components. The regulations
for the CS Army were written by William Gilham,
under the title of Manual of Instruction for the
Volunteers and Militia of the Confederate States.
Gilham was a colonel of volunteers, instructor of
tactics, and Commandant of Cadets, Virginia Mili-
tary Institute. Gilham wrote his manual and com-
pleted it by December, 1860.

45. Heitman, Historical Register, pp. 596-597.
    Weigley, History, p. 190. Army Lineage Series,
    Infantry, p. 13.

46. In 1855, service outside of the United States
    was west of the frontier, except for California
    and Texas.

47. Secretary of War Report, 1858, an enclosure,
    dated December 6, 1858, pp. 3-4.

48. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 21. Matloff,
    History, p. 185.

49. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 24. Extract
    from the Report of the Secretary of War, 1861,
    December 1, 1861, p. 22. "The organization of
    the increased force, it will be noticed, is dif-
    ferent from that of the old Army. This ques-
    tion was fully considered by officers of the
    Army connected with this department, and, after
    much deliberation, it was concluded to adopt the
    French regimental system of three battalions to
    a regiment. Each battalion is commanded by a
    major, with a colonel, and lieutenant colonel
    for the general command of the regiment. This,
    it is believed, is the best organization now
    existing. The number of field officers is less
    than under the old system, and, therefore, much
    less expensive. Whether this organization may
    not advantageously be extended to the old Army,
    after the passage of a law providing for a re-
    tired list , is a question which may properly
    engage the attention of Congress."

50. The leaders in authority did not believe that
    there was time to bother with reorganizing units
    that were already formed, especially since so
    many units still remained to be organized. In
    addition, the old one battalion regiments were a
    part of tradition that could not be discarded.
    Finally, the newer three battalion organizations
    were larger than the old one battalion regiments
    and the change would have required additional
    personnel.

51. Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 15,
    Washington, D.C.: War Department, May 4, 1861.
    Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 16,
    Washington, D.C.: War Department, May 4, 1861.
    Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 48,
    Washington, D.C.: War Department, July 31, 1861.
    Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 49,
    Washington, D.C.: War Department, August 3. 1861.

52. Heitman, Historical Register, pp. 600-601.

53. Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 55, Washington, D.C.: War Department, May 10, 1861. During the Civil War, some cavalry companies began to call themselves troops. For many years the smallest unit for administrative purposes in the cavalry was officially the company. The word troop had first officially been used in an act of 17 July, 1862, which prescribed the organization of a "company or troop." The next step came when the revised regulations of 1873 omitted company. Yet for almost ten more years the U. S. Army had cavalry companies. By 1881 many units were using the newer term, and in 1883 all were directed to use it. Still later, however, it was not unusual for both terms to be used in the same regiment.

54. Army Lineage Series, Armor-Cavalry, p. 16.

55. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, pp. 28-29.

56. In forwarding recruits, the party was placed under charge of one of the recruits. A member of the recruiting party was not sent with recruits. In the absence of special instructions, recruits were enlisted for the regiment only, and forwarded to regimental headquarters for assignment to companies.

57. F. S. Armstrong, Regimental Recruiting, Kansas City, Mo.: Kimberly Publishing Co., 1899. "The object of regimental recruiting was to give the different regiments opportunity to obtain their own recruits by sending out traveling recruiting parties, consisting of their own officers and men. The system produced good results, as it was conducted by officers and men immediately interested in the quality of recruits accepted. It reached rural districts, not easily reached by general service recruiting parties, and thus afforded opportunities for ascertaining more accurately the antecedents, character, and age of applicants, and, when properly conducted, was attended with a minimum of cost. It afforded opportunity of spreading information, and of correcting erroneous impressions concerning the duties and obligations, rights and privileges of a soldier, and attracted to the Army young men who otherwise would have been lost to it."

58. In an Army exceeding 10,000 men attaching batteries to regiments or brigades sacrificed the concentration which made artillery-fire formidable. Brigade

commanders could not or would not give both their
regiments and battery(ies) proper supervision.
Neither did they understand artillery resupply,
who was responsible for resupply or through what
channels it came.

59. From 1861 to May, 1863, army commanders assigned
their artillery at a ratio of 2.5 pieces per
1,000 men.

60. Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World, New York:
Collier Books, 1959, p. 176.

61. Randolph H. McKim, The Numerical Strength of the
Confederate Army, New York: The Neale Publishing
Co., 1912, pp. 26-27.

62. The Army did not eliminate the need for these
details until the Act of 1912 established an
enlisted branch of the quartermaster corps which
enabled the assignment of a service company to
each regiment.

63. In April, 1863, the Army established the Invalid
Corps as an organization of men who had become
physically unfit for combat. In March, 1864,
this organization became the Veteran Reserve Corps,
its function was to perform duty that would re-
lease men for frontline service, such as guard
duty, nursing, and cooking.

64. Gordon R. Young (Ed.), The Army Almanac, Harris-
burg, Pa.: The Stackpole Co., January, 1959,
p. 267,

65. In the years that followed, the school changed
names several times, in 1907 becoming the Mounted
Service School; in 1919, the Cavalry School; on 1
November, 1946, the Ground General School; and in
1950, the Army General School. The school was dis-
continued in May, 1955.

66. A regiment of cavalry consisted of twelve com-
panies formed into three squadrons of four com-
panies each. Besides the commanding officer who
was a colonel, the regimental staff included
seven officers, six enlisted men, a surgeon, and
two assistant surgeons. Each company was author-
ized three officers, fifteen non-commissioned
officers, and fifty-five privates. A civilian

veterinarian accompanies the regiment although he was not included in the table of organization. The 9th and 10th Cavalry were composed of Negro enlisted men and white officers. Their organization differed from the others in that each has an assigned chaplain whose duties included instructing the enlisted men in fundamental school subjects. At that time and until 1901, chaplains were normally assigned to Army posts.

67. By the act of March 8, 1898, the artillery arm was increased by two regiments, the additional organizations to be composed of twelve batteries each, two of which in each regiment to be organized, in the discretion of the President, as field artillery. These regiments were designated in orders as the Sixth and Seventh, respectively; the headquarters of the Sixth established at Fort McHenry, Md., and those of the Seventh at Fort Slocum, New York; the nucleus of each battery to be formed by the detail of fifteen enlisted men obtained by transfer from existing batteries, other than those on the Pacific coast, and regulated by the proper department commanders. Under General Orders, No. 21, dated April 20, 1898, the equipment of each battery of light artillery was directed to include six guns and caissons, one combined forge and battery wagon, and one hundred horses.

CHAPTER 3

1. Report of the Secretary of War, 1900, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1900, pp. 131-139. Report of the Secretary of War, 1901, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1901, pp. 145-168. Reports of the War Department, 1889, Vol. I, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1889, pp. 44-45.

2. Maurice Matloff, (Ed.), American Military History, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969, p. 347.

3. Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1965, pp. 622-623.

4. Walter Millis, American Military Thought, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966, p. 152. Adjutant General's Office, General Order No. 9, Washington, D.C.: HQ U. S. Army, February 6, 1901. Native Filipinos were organized into companies in September, 1899. However, they were initially paid as civilian employees of the Quartermaster. On October 1, 1901, legislation authorized fifty companies. The officers were from the Regular Army except for the 1st and 2d lieutenants who an Army board selected from the most qualified natives. Congress authorized Filipino battalions in 1904. After World War I these battalions, most of which had been parts of provisional regiments during the war, were grouped into regiments and given proper designations. The regiments were the 43d, 45th, 57th, and 62d Infantry (Philippine Scouts).

5. Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1901, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Introduction by Elihu Root, Secretary of War, May 1, 1901.

6. Army Regulations, 1901, p. 39, Article XXXI, para. 254.

7. The French, Austrian, and Prussian infantries both used regiments of three battalions, but the battalions were far larger. The Prussians had a thousand enlisted men in their battalions. The French had seven hundred men in theirs while the American battalions seldom had more than 425. Russian regiments in the same period had four battalions to a regiment. Each Russian battalion had one thousand men. David R. Jones, The Imperial Russian Life Guards Grenadier Regiment, 1906-1917: The Disintegration of an Elite Unit, Military Affairs, October, 1969, 33, pp. 289-302. Hubert Foster, Organization, London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1913, pp. 138-143.

8. War Department, Army Regulation 615-210, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, dated, November 25, 1931.

9. Matloff, History, p. 351. The Dick Act accomplished the alignment of the National Guard and the Regular Army by providing federal funds. In addition, the Act prescribed drill at least once a month

supplemented with short annual training periods.
The Act also authorized detailing of regular
officers to guard units and joint maneuvers.
Limitations on the call-up and control of guard
units severely restricted its effectiveness.
Legislation in 1908 and 1914 reduced the restric-
tions and increased the power of the President
to prescribe the length of federal service, and
appoint officers of the guard when the guard was
on federal service.

10. Adjutant General's Office, General Order No. 72,
Washington, D.C.: War Department, June 3, 1911.

11. Prior to 1915, headquarters companies did not
exist in any of the regiments. A small staff
and an administrative detachment handled ad-
ministration.

12. Legislation authorized all regiments by 1916 a
colonel, a lieutenant colonel, three majors,
fifteen captains, sixteen first lieutenants, and
sixteen second lieutenants.

13. United States Department of the Army Lineage Series,
Infantry, Part I, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1972, pp. 32-34. United States
Department of the Army Lineage Series, Armor-
Cavalry, Part I, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1969, pp. 34-35. Bruce
Jacobs, Soldiers, New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
1958, p. 19. Oliver L. Spaulding, The United
States Army in War and Peace, New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1937, pp. 402-403.

14. Jacobs, Soldiers, pp. 20-21. Matloff, History,
pp. 32-37. Spaulding, History, pp. 407-408

15. The National Defense Act of June 3, 1916 author-
ized a Regular Army of 220,000 officers and men.
Congress authorized the National Guard 450,000
officers and men. The Regular Army now had
authorization for twenty-five regiments of cavalry,
sixty-four regiments of infantry, and twenty-one
field artillery regiments.

16. Report of the Chief of Staff. In Secretary of
War Report, 1916, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, September 30, 1916.

17. United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919,
Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department
of the Army, 1948. This document gives the best

available explanation of the organization of
Pershing's forces.

18. Pershing chose to organize the square divisions
because the existing divisions were only on
paper and the Army had not had an opportunity
to test them. Army planners did not design the
existing organization for a division for the
trench warfare of Europe. Pershing felt that
the division designed in 1916 was too large and
unwieldly.

19. Report of General John J. Pershing, No. 1912-S
General Headquarters, A.E.F., November 20, 1918.

20. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 43. Matloff,
History, p. 374. This platoon ultimately became
the cannon company of the regiment. The cannon
company eventually developed into an anti-tank
company and for a short time in World War II, it
actually had a 105mm howitzer. It was called a
howitzer company in the TO&Es of World War II.

21. Holt Manufacturing Co., Photographs Showing Cater-
pillar Development for Military Use, Stockton
California, (circa. 1918). Notes on Artillery,
The Field Artillery Journal, April, June, 1917,
7(No. 2), p. 168.

22. Remount duty was the operation of a depot for
horses where they were broken or trained for har-
ness. Remount stations also provided an exchange
service for wounded, or tired animals, for fresh
mounts. The US Army received approximately 4,000
horses per month from the French. The A.E.F. used
250,000 horses from May, 1917 to November, 1918.

23. The National Army was the designation of the force
raised by conscription.

24. Pioneer infantry regiments resembled infantry only
in si 2. Pioneer infantry regiments contained
3,551 men. The unit was primarily a labor regi-
ment used to repair bridges, repair roads, and
construct fortifications. The Army organized a
total of thirty-seven pioneer infantry regiments
during World War II.

25. Morris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establish-
ment, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965, p. 82.

26. Vernon Pizer, The United States Army, New York:
     Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, pp. 34-35. Army Lineage
     Series. Infantry, p. 56.

27. Matloff, History, pp. 407-408. Army Lineage Series,
     Infantry, p. 50.

28. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 49. G. B. McReynolds,
     The Field Artillery Board, The Field Artillery Journal,
     July, 1942, 32(No. 7), p. 505. The Field Artillery
     Board was the first board. It was created by the
     Adjutant's Office, General Order No. 60, Washington,
     D.C.: HQ, Department of the Army, June 25, 1902. The
     fact is that in 1902 its purpose was not as a steering
     agency for development and proposal but, it was to
     advise the faculty of the School of Application for
     Cavalry and Field Artillery at Fort Riley, Kansas, on
     light field artillery matters. It was also responsible
     to the Commanding General of the Army through the
     Adjutant General for information and recommendations.

29. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 51.

30. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 55.

31. Army Lineage Series, Armor-Cavalry, p. 48. The impact
     of placing the tanks under infantry control was such
     that there was a great deal of theoretical but almost
     no tangible progress in tank production or in tank
     tactics in the United States Army. Production was
     limited to a few hand tooled test models, only thirty-
     five of which were built between 1920 and 1935. Re-
     garding the use of tanks with the infantry, the of-
     ficial doctrine of 1939 was a repeat of the doctrine
     of 1923. It was stated that, "As a rule, tanks are
     employed to assist the advance of infantry foot troops,
     either preceding or accompanying the infantry assault
     echelon."

32. Army Lineage Series, Armor-Cavalry, p. 53. he reor-
     ganization under the 1920 National Defense Act reduced
     the regiments to six troops, a headquarters and head-
     quarters troop, and a service troop.

33. Army Lineage Series, Armor-Cavalry, p. 54

34. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 49.

35. Jacobs, Soldiers, p. 26. Each regiment had two TO&Es
     one for peacetime and one in the event of a war.

36. H. G. Bishop, Field Artillery, The King of Battles,
     Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935, pp. 37-45.

37. Letter, Office of the Chief of Staff, Subject: Reorganization of Division and Higher Units, dtd. November 5, 1935. signed Gen. Merlin Craig.

38. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, pp. 53-54, 58.

39. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 56.

40. Pizer, U. S. Army, pp. 35-36.

41. Notes for Field Artillery; Tactics, The Field Artillery Journal, November-December, 1940, 30(No. 6), p. 436. Artillery massed late in World War I by placing the control of battalions and batteries under groups or brigades who massed the fires. The Artillery Groups and Artillery Brigades did not exist in peacetime. Initially upon organization of artillery regiments in France with French weapons division artillery and corps artillery controlled massing but, it was merely an attempt to place fires close to the target since the common grid and transfer was invented much later by Col. Summerall.

42. Jacobs, Soldiers, p. 27.

43. Army Lineage Series, Armor-Cavalry, p. 60.

44. Army Lineage Series, Armor-Cavalry, p. 60.

45. Gordon R. Young, (Ed.), The Army Almanac, Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Co., 1959, p. 231.

46. Young, Almanac, p. 231.

47. Army Lineage Series, Armor-Cavalry, p. 59. Armored infantry regiments later became the mechanized infantry. However, during World War II all but two armored infantry regiments broke up to form separate armored infantry battalions during the war.

48. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, pp. 59-62.

49. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, pp. 63-66. Young, Almanac, p. 276.

50. Organization, Equipment and Tactical Employment of the Infantry Division, United States Forces, European Theater, APO 408, "The General Board" Study Number 15. 1945.

51. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 70. The demobilization on the basis of an individual point system had no

relationship whatsoever to the size of the Army in
the future. The point system was a method of as-
signing points for decorations, time spent in com-
bat, time in service, and points for other variables
such as marital status or wounds. The men with the
highest score were discharged first regardless of
grade or military occupational specialty.

52. Landon G. Cox & Harold G. Maynard, The New Armored
Division, The Field Artillery Journal, September-
October, 1949, 39(No. 5), pp. 218-220 and cont. in
November-December, 1949, 39(No. 6), pp. 254-257.

53. George McCutchen & John F. Staples, Organization of
the New Infantry Division, The Field Artillery Journal
September-October, 1949, 39(No. 5), pp. 199-200.

54. William A. Hadfield, Your New Field Artillery Or-
ganization, The Field Artillery Journal, November-
December, 1949, 39(No. 6), pp. 244-249.

55. Matloff, History, p. 592. Army Lineage Series,
Infantry, pp. 73-76.

56. Matloff, History, p. 540. Army Lineage Series, Armor-
Cavalry, pp. 75-79.

57. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, pp. 79-88.

58. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 86.

59. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 89. TO&Es entitled
"Reorganization of the Airborne Division (ROTAD),"
and "Reorganization of the Current Armored Division
(ROCAD)," and "Reorganization of the Current Infantry
Division (ROCID)" were published on August 10,
December 1, and December 20, 1956, respectively.
By June, 1958, all fifteen active Regular Army divi-
sions had been reorganized under these tables, and
by June, 1959, all but one of the thirty-seven divi-
sions in the reserve components had adopted the
organizations. The ROTAD tables were superseded by
the final TO&Es for Pentomic airborne units on June
31, 1958. However, the final D-series TO&Es for
elements of infantry and armored divisions were not
published until February 1, and May 1, 1960.

60. Robert D. Schweitz, Army to Reorganize Divisional
Structure, Army-Navy-Air Force Register, December 27,
1958, 80, p. 1. Myles G. Marken, The Atomic Divisions,

Army Information Digest, September, 1956, 20(No. 9),
pp. 58-64. T. L. Sherburne, Reorganizing the 101st
Airborne, Army Information Digest, June, 1957, 12
(No. 6), pp. 12-23. Pizer, U. S. Army, pp. 36-37.
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61. The combat command provided the means of exercising
control over the tactical units in the armor divi-
sion. The combat command also gave the armored
division commander a vital link for coordinating
and maneuvering his combat elements. The combat
command concept made for the kind of flexibility
that is necessary on a modern battlefield without
sacrificing the control necessary to prevent the
deterioration of a combat operation into an unco-
ordinated mass of little fire fights. The combat
command system was a result of the elimination of
the brigade and an attempt to impose a tactical role
on an administrative organization. The regiment
simply could not handle the job with a sufficient
degree of flexibility.

62. In truth, the pentomic division had proven that it
did not have sufficient conventional holding power
and needed more men and equipment to be capable of
sustained combat. It also upset the balance of of-
ficer grade requirements and was a threat to the
development of the junior field grade officers be-
cause of the shortage of positions for lieutenant
colonels. In 1961, the Army revised the divisional
structure to provide a better balance between the
mobility and the firepower of the battalion sized
organization. In addition, flexibility was built
into the entire division structure. Under the
Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) con-
cept the Army began in 1962 to form four types of
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68. Army Lineage Series, Infantry, p. 99.

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8. Baynes, Soldier, pp. 103-104 & 210.

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lengthy. The important part of the bulletin is con-
tained in Appendix A which is an address by Major
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It has more than 18 pages with numerous charts and
statistics in an annex that is also a part of the bul-
letin. It contains a consolidated report and critical
analysis of the problems the British have had with their
system.

10. "Teeth to tail ratio" is the same as the American phrase "tooth to tail" which means the ratio of combat troops to support troops.

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12. There are about 172 Regular Army regiments retained under CARS. The Army National Guard Regiments total about 225. In all 397 CARS regiments in 4 basic branches. Think of the costs involved if all regiments had separate homes. Even if all regiments are assigned to the branch centers and schools, the cost to the center and school commands just for routine mail will be staggering. Assume that all personnel are assigned to home regiments and assignments within parent regiments becomes a consideration in personnel actions. Under present Army missions and personnel systems the lack of flexibility and the malutilization of personnel and facilities that would result would produce a highly undesirable situation. If the regimental headquarters remains under Department of the Army control with some centralization it may be feasible to find a workable solution. To attempt to use civilian communities or present and former forts, posts, camps or stations would in all probability result in 300 or more regimental headquarters/homes and the need for some form of centralized command with funds. At the present time none of these proposals are financially feasible.

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AR 240-5	Battalions March 20, 1926
AR 245-5	Companies July 20, 1925
AR 250-5	Bands March 1, 1933
AR 260-10	Flags February 20, 1935
AR 600-750	Personnel June 3, 1931
AR 615-210	Enlisted Men Foreign Service November 25, 1931

Department of the Army Pamphlet, 355-1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January, 1955.

End 9-76